

UDC 327.51

Poble D. K.

Professor assistant

Department of International Relations,

Faculty of International Relations, Political Science and Sociology

Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University

Tel.: +380980534393

E-mail: dmitry_poble@onu.edu.ua, dmitrypoble@ukr.net

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5898-3343>

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.18524/2707-5206.2022.35.259135>

**THE 2019–2021 LEBANON CIVIL PROTESTS: CONCISE COMPARISON
WITH MOLDOVA AND BELARUS PEACEFUL RALLIES AND ASSEMBLIES**

Lebanon, a unique, poly-confessional Eastern Mediterranean country of Arab origin with a long Phoenician history, has seen yet another wave of unrest in the last two years. Around the same period, widespread protests were aroused in two post-soviet countries in Eastern Europe, expressing their outrage at the falsification of vote tallies, corruption, and the political motivation of their governments in the face of a worsening economic situation. The aim of the study was to find out the common and distinctive elements of these civil rallies and assemblies, as well as to predict their possible impact on interregional relations and geopolitical tendencies. The article may indicate some unique features due to the lack of fundamental research studies on the theme rather than analytics and media reports. A concise comparison is made of Lebanon's, Moldova's, and Belarus's situation with respect to their establishment, political and economic crisis, resulting protest actions. Some peculiarities were discovered following the interests of internal and external political groups and their influence. A cautious prognosis was made in order to forecast some further developments in the situation around these countries, including the attitude of the key actors in the region towards the processes inside and outside, trying to tip the scales in their favor.

Key words: widespread protests, falsification of vote tallies, corruption, civil rallies and assemblies, establishment, key actors.

Introduction

Plato, the ancient Greek philosopher, explored the meaning of justice in his Socratic dialogue «The Republic,» describing the sophisticated relationship between the state-city and the ordinary man. The famous student of Socrates and the teacher of Aristotle wrote one of the most influential philosophical and political works around 375 BC. (Brickhouse & Smith, 2022). Today, 159 sovereign states in the world apply the term «Republic» in the official names of their countries. If compared, for example, two Koreas as the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the DPRK), we can hardly argue that North Korea can fully comply with the Oxford Dictionary definition of «a state in which supreme power is held by the people and their elected representatives, and which has an elected or nominated presi-

dent rather than a monarch.» (Oxford Dictionary, 2005). It's about the fact that the term «republic» is incorporated into the official names of the states, which have rather distorted the concept, and the DPRK is widely considered a totalitarian regime and a military dictatorship (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Republic Countries 2022

Source: World Population Review

The main purpose of the article is to give a concise comparative analysis of a series of civil protests that occurred practically within the same period and affected one Arab country in the Mediterranean, and two post-soviet countries in Eastern Europe. All the subjects of comparison formally have the same political system and have insignificant differences in their constitutions: they are parliamentary republics with all the appropriate attributes of power. Thus, the reality of the authorized officials, implementing their power liabilities, differs a lot in each country and forms a certain benchmark for political studies.

The methodology applied in the article is similar to the comparative method widely used in political science. The Merriam-Webster dictionary gives a common definition of the comparative method as «a method of investigation (as of ethnologic phenomena and relations) based on comparison» (2021). In his article «Comparative Analysis within Political Science,» Alexander Safford defines Comparative Analysis (CA) as «a methodology within political science that is often used in the study of political systems, institutions, or processes.» This can be done on a local, regional, national and international scale. Comparative research is carried out on the basis of empirical evidence

collected and systematized from the recording and classification of the reality of political practices. Comparative analysis within political science is characterized by the lack of an ideological and theoretical narrative and its tendency to apply a scientifically constrained methodology to reach more political understanding. Yet, on the other hand, the study concentrated on two or more countries has been sometimes criticized «for producing less in-depth information compared to studies involving one country» (Franzese, 2007). It is worth mentioning that Petro Martynenko, an eminent Ukrainian scientist, specialized in the field of constitutional law, international law, comparative law has made a significant contribution to comparative studies. He described comparative law as «a science that studies the connections and interactions of various legal systems, the principles of their typological commonality, elements of similarity and difference, common and national-specific, comparability and incompatibility, their internal typological tendencies» (Krasin, 2011).

Lebanon

The 2019–2021 Lebanese civil protests that have taken place in this Middle East country are known locally as the 17th October revolution. The pretext that triggered a series of civil protests in Lebanon was the announcement of increased taxes on tobacco products, fuel, and IP telephony calls for WhatsApp applications (Chehayeb & Sewell, 2019). Protesters' movements spread across the country, and their social and economic demands for real reforms to end social stratification were fueled by claims of democratization of secular fundamentals due to sectarian rule and for a democratic society free of sectarian and partisan allegiances. The growing frustration of the protesters was aimed at the Lebanese authorities because of their inability to cope with unemployment (Figure 2)

The daily lives of the Lebanese people are also affected by structural problems in the Lebanese economy, such as a lack of capacity to generate and distribute electricity, widespread illegal connections, and the business control of the 'generator mafia,' which allegedly compensates for the lack of electricity with extra charges during scattered power outages at state-owned power plants. It should be mentioned that the operation of obsolete equipment with bad environmental standards, like fuel oil CHPs and congestion on major highways. At the same time, Lebanon's external public debt grew rapidly, sinking the country's financial system deeper into the money pit (Figure 4).

Finally, the most-talked-about Lebanese «garbage crisis» of 2015–2017 hasn't found a solution (Haines-Young, 2015). Social tension in Lebanon has also risen due to the political crisis in all governmental structures over the past few years. Thus, the activists of various parties have deliberately maintained tension to make a political point or two through intra-party rivalry. The origin of Lebanese government mismanagement and dysfunction lays in the sectarian political system embodied in the articles of the Taif agreement, concluded in 1989. The said document is sometimes called a Document of National Accord or National Reconciliation Accord despite its announced goal of providing 'the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon' (Krayem, 2014). Historically, Lebanon has always



Figure 2. Lebanon’s unemployment rate from 2004 to 2018 in the chart
 Source: www.CEICDATA. com / Central Administration of Statistics and a stagnant economy (Figure 3).



Figure 3. Exhibit1: Economic stagnation settles in Lebanon
 Source: IMF and AXA IM Research as of 5 December 2019
 Yoy = year-on-year




Figure 4. General government gross debt as a share of GDP for Lebanon
Source: IMF STATISTA

been a mosaic of various religious fractions and its society is still divided into isolated ethnic and confessional communities. Each community pays a fee for representation in the central government. The governance structure within the Republic is determined by its confessional origin. The 18 religious groups, which are officially recognized by Lebanese society, combine twelve Christian sects, four Muslim denominations, the Druze sect, and Judaism (El Rajji, 2014). Articles 24 and 95 of the Lebanese constitution determine an equally authoritative position for Muslims and Christians in the Chamber of Deputies (National Council of Lebanon), as well as proportional authority among the districts where different religious groups predominate (Lebanon's Constitution, 2021). Each religious group represented in the national parliament seeks to take over more power. (Figure 5)

Furthermore, because the numerous civil wars have resulted in several waves of migration from and to Lebanon, they frequently rely on external patronage. Lebanese migrants in the hundreds of thousands have settled in Europe, neighboring Syria and Turkey, the USA and Canada. While keeping ties with their relatives at home, they have unwillingly become a tool for influencing Lebanese politics. Communities of Shia and Sunni Muslims, Alevis and Alawis, Armenians and Maronites, Orthodox Greeks and Greek Catholics, Orthodox Arabs and Arab Catholics have their own attitudes towards different countries, as well as different political parties. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees have lived in Lebanon for decades. In recent years, an additional 2 million Syrian Orthodox Arabs, Yazidis, Kurds, and Assyrians have fled war-torn Syria and settled in Lebanon as isolated communities of Syrian Orthodox Arabs, Yazidis, Kurds, and Assyrians. At the same time, many Lebanese generations who have grown up among the barbed wire checkpoints close to neighboring tormented Syria are tired of the strife.




Figure 5. The Confessional System in the Lebanese Parliament
Source: Pettalides J. C. (2011)

In October-November 2021, Beirut's relations with the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf escalated, from which substantial financial assistance could come. Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates withdrew their ambassadors from Lebanon following an interview with Lebanese Information Minister George Kordahi, where he condemned Riyadh and Abu Dhabi for the military campaign in Yemen. To restore the contacts, the Arab monarchies demanded the resignation of the information minister and a change in Beirut's policy towards Hezbollah. And furthermore, Israel is also lobbying the US to attach conditions to its aid to Beirut with certain restrictions on Hezbollah's activities. All of the above does not ease the situation in Lebanon at all but provokes an escalation of conflicts across the political spectrum in the country. (Belenkaya, 2021).

Lebanese citizens voted in the parliamentary elections on Sunday, May 15, 2022, for the first time since the entire government resigned in 2020. 718 candidates were running for 128 seats in parliament, some of them from new political groups that emerged from a protest movement that began in 2019, when traditional parties accused them of corruption and blamed them for default, the deepest crisis, and later for the explosion in the port of Beirut in August 2020. According to the official results of the parliamentary elections in Lebanon, Iran's allied party Hezbollah and its allies lost a majority in the Lebanese parliament. (Nakonechna, 2022). The Hezbollah-led coalition won 61 seats in the country's 128-member parliament. The biggest winner of the election was the nationalist Christian Lebanese Party, led by Samir Judge, one of Hezbollah's fiercest critics. Parliament Speaker Nabi Berry's Amal retained the 27 seats allocated to Shiites.

Belarus

The Belarusian protests of 2020–2021 have taken to the streets with thousands of protestors following the disputed results of presidential elections held on August 9th, thus permitting Alexander Lukashenko to stay in power for a sixth term in office. He claimed that 80 % of the polls were in his favor, which is untrue. Belarus is considered an authoritarian state even though Article 1 of its constitution says «the republic of Belarus is a unitary, democratic, social state based on the rule of law» (1994). Belarus' 1994 constitution provides for the direct election of the President, as head of state, and of the parliament, the bicameral legislature known as the National Assembly of Belarus. The executive power is represented by the Council of Ministers and its head, as the nominal head of the government is appointed by the President.

The protests in Belarus are not primarily geopolitical, as compared with the Maidan protests of 2013–2014 in Ukraine. The opposition in Ukraine and in Georgia sought Western affiliation opportunities including EU Association and NATO membership future. The situation in Belarus seems to be different. Sviatlana Tsikhanouvskaia, the main opposition candidate, in her video speech to the members of the EU Parliament on the 25th of August 2020, rejected the geopolitical character of the revolution in Belarus. «It is neither an anti-Russian nor a pro-Russian revolution. It is neither anti-EU nor pro-EU. It is a democratic revolution. The demand of Belarusians is simple: a free and fair election» (Liubakova, 2020). Meanwhile, former Ukrainian President Yanukovich refused to sign the EU association agreement, prompting civil protestors to take to the streets and set fire to tires, rejecting his politically motivated decision to abandon national hopes for future membership in the European Union. The protestors' movement in Belarus at the very beginning aimed to put an end to recurrent autocratic corruption in the country without any geopolitical shift. Nevertheless, the peaceful civil rallies and assemblies in Minsk gave Moscow cause for certain concern. Democracies that have arisen on Russia's Western border — the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia — the Kremlin seems to have accepted as 'existing reality', but the Belarus case may cause more worries about «both a geopolitical shift westward and the demonstration effect of its closest East Slavic neighbor embracing democracy» (Courtney & Haltzel, 2020).

The worst-ever political crisis around Lukashenko's doubtful election win in August 2020 exposed once more the evidence of Belarus' dependence on supplies from energy-rich Russia. Belorussian goods are mostly exported to Russia (more than 46 %), while the EU's comparable share is only 24 %. Belarus imports more than half of its goods and services from Russia, while the EU imports 20 % of its total imports. And in the financial area, Russia is considered the largest credit holder for its neighbor, possessing 38 % of Belarus's national debt. (Martin, 2020).

President Lukashenko, given his precarious position and the overwhelming discontent of the population, initiated a constitutional referendum in early 2022. Despite protests, repressions, and widespread public opposition, the referendum was held on February 27, 2022. According to the official data,

65.2 % of Belarusian citizens voted for amendments and additions to the Belarusian Constitution. The amendments provide for the creation of a new constitutional body, the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly (VNC), which will be created gradually, allowing the ruler to remain in power for another two years.

Moldova

The Moldovan protests of 2020 were led by farmers and young people in favor of newly elected president Maia Sandu against the pro-Russian premier, Jon Chicu. The nationwide demonstrations started on November 21 and were extended to December 23 when, under massive public pressure, Chicu announced his resignation. It is useful to review the background to these developments and analyze some internal political dynamics as they were in February 2019 (Figure 6).



Figure 6. The February 2019 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections
Source: Simpson, H. (2019)

An impressive result for PSRM, Moldovan socialist party-successors of former communists, and modest achievement of SOR, Euro-sceptic party, were quite predictable. However, in addition to the growing impact of ACUM, the anticorruption coalition, PDM, the Democratic Party of Moldova, achieved surprising success, receiving 29.7 % of the votes cast. And, in the meantime, the party was led by Vlad Plahotniuc, an infamous oligarch who fled to Turkey after the surprising comeback of the Democrats as a «product of sophisticated techniques of political and electoral manipulation.» (Simpson, 2019) The said techniques promoted the Democrats more control instruments over both the government and the parliament. Their election campaign was based not on ideas and principles and it turned to putting patronage, power, and material interests first.

On May 5, 2022, the European Parliament approved granting the status of an EU-candidate member to the Republic of Moldova. «The EU should grant

Moldova candidate status in accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (according to which a country that adheres to the values of the EU can apply for accession) and on merit-based principles,» the European Parliament's resolution says. The document also proposes that the European Commission complete the evaluation of Chisinau's application as soon as possible. Regardless of the conclusion, «the Moldovan authorities are undoubtedly on the right track in implementing key reforms, in particular in the areas of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights,» the resolution said. (Kropman, 2022). The European Parliament also called on the EU to give greater support to Moldova, both through new macro-financial assistance and further measures to liberalize transport services and trade.

It's pertinent to note that Moldova offers some kind of a «gateway» for Ukraine in its access to the Southeastern part of Europe, while at the same time keeping its role as a transportation hub in the region. Many international highways that pass from the Asian direction supply goods from China, Russia, and other countries via Ukraine to Moldova and farther to EU members. Another area of interest is Moldova's role as a possible connection link to the energy system of Europe. Moldova is already connected to the gas transportation system of Romania as well as the EU gas network. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are trying to create «an integration center for the territories of the former Soviet Union» to lead, as a good example, other former Soviet entities. (Sichen, 2021). It isn't coincident that the said republics are facing some similar challenges resulting from the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation in its persistent attempts to dampen the pro-Western spirit there and to regain control. Since the early 1990-s, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have become some kind of testing ground for Russia's military adventures to undermine the internal stability of independent republics, to provoke armed clashes, and to deploy organic troops or militant groups supervised and supplied by the Ministry of Defense of Russia. This scenario was practically applied in Transnistria, Moldova, the Crimea and Donbas, Ukraine, and in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia.

The protest movements in Lebanon, Moldova, and Belarus did not lead to a radical revision of the domestic and foreign policies of these republics. Lebanon had experienced another change of government and parliamentary re-elections, plus discussions on the confessional structure of the country, were postponed for the distant future. Moldova's confrontation between the European course of the authorities and the pro-Russian opposition continues, and Belarusian dictator Lukashenko, having dispersed the protests inside the country by force and repression, has tied himself tightly to Russian assistance, like the Syrian version of the Bashar al-Assad regime. Speaking on the geopolitical aspects, one can identify certain regional shifts with regard to the partial weakening of Iranian influence in the Lebanese political arena and the Syrian crisis' pressure on the economy and political spectrum in this Mediterranean country. At the same time, the idea of Russian dominance at the regional level continues to be actively pushed by the leadership of the Russian Federation despite the general condemnation and, in many cases,

rejection of the policy towards neighbors or the suppression of egregious violations of human rights and war crimes. All this leads to a certain imbalance in the system of regional relations, not only at the regional but at the global level.

Conclusions

Based on this analysis, the following conclusions have been drawn:

1. All the three components that provoked mass clashes and protests in the objects of study are surprisingly similar: a dramatic deterioration in the economic situation, pathological rejection of the ruling elite (non-removability of the ruling elites, corruption, falsification of elections), and finally, the impact of external factors (the presence of aggressive neighbors, hostilities, the influx of refugees, diktat and lobbying of interests in relations with the outside world, etc).

2. Despite the formal similarity of the social and constitutional structures in all countries, historical, cultural, and religious ties and trends somehow affected the methods of the authorities' struggle with popular uprisings.

3. The algorithm for resolving the protest unrest in the country by the Lebanese authorities turned out to be more «democratic» and more understandable in relation to the constitutional structure of the country compared with a similar situation in the two former post-Soviet republics.

4. The Lebanese authorities were forced to change the government, hold snap elections, and start discussing the confessional structure of the country, enshrined in national legislation.

5. The authorities of Moldova in their European strategy were facing strong opposition from the supporters of «the Russian world», the Transnistrian enclave and the oligarchs associated with shadow operations with Russian business, and the constantly pressing threat of direct military intervention, as was the case with Ukraine.

6. The Republic of Belarus, after blatant election fraud, resorted to brutal forceful methods against its own population, launched an outright propaganda campaign to «legitimize» its totalitarian regime, and provided its territory and facilities for Russia's attack on neighboring Ukraine.

7. In all three cases, direct and indirect external interference—Russian, Syrian, or Iranian factors—had a strong influence and limited the ability to resolve crises promptly.

References [Список використаної літератури]

- Belenkaya, M. (2021, November 22). Lebanese Cedar is Your Comrade / Lebanon. The situation in the country. *Kommersant*. Retrieved from <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5088269> [in Russian]. [Беленькая М. Ливанский кедр тебе товарищ. Ливан. Ситуация в стране. *Коммерсантъ*. 2021, листопад 22. URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5088269> (дата звернення: 02.02.2022)].
- Boguslavskaya, A. (2022, March 1). No Changes till 2024? A New Constitution of Belarus: What will Change and When. *DW/Top Stories/Belarus*. [in Russian]. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/ru/novaja-konstituzija-belarusi-chto-izmenitsia-i-kogda/a-60960524> [Богуславская, А. (2022, березень 1). До 2024-го без перемен? Новая Конституция Беларуси: что изменится

- и когда. DW / Темы дня / Беларусь. URL: <https://www.dw.com/ru/novaja-konstituzija-belarusi-chto-izmenitsia-i-kogda/a-60960524> (дата звернення: 03.02.2022)].
- Brickhouse, T. & Smith, N. (2022). Plato (427–347 B. C. E.). *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy IEP*. Retrieved from: <https://iep.utm.edu/plato> [Brickhouse T., Smith N. Plato (427–347 B. C. E.). *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy IEP*. 2022. URL: <https://iep.utm.edu/plato> (дата звернення: 07.05.2022)].
- Chehayeb, K. & Sewell, A. (2019, November 4). Why Protesters in Lebanon are Taking to the Streets. *Foreign Policy: Explainer*. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/02/lebanon-protesters-movement-streets-explainer> [in English]. [Chehayeb K., Sewell A. Why Protesters in Lebanon are Taking to the Streets. *Foreign Policy: Explainer*. 2019, November 4. URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/02/lebanon-protesters-movement-streets-explainer> (дата звернення: 07.05.2022)].
- Comparative method. (2021, May 21). *Definition of rcomparative methodr by Merriam-Webster*. Retrieved from [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/comparative %20method](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/comparative%20method) [in English]. [Comparative method. *Definition of rcomparative methodr by Merriam-Webster*. 2021, May 21. URL: [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/comparative %20method](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/comparative%20method) (дата звернення: 07.05.2022)].
- Constitution of the Republic of Belarus. (1994). *President of the Republic of Belarus*. Retrieved from <https://president.gov.by/en/gosudarstvo/constitution> [in English]. [Constitution of the Republic of Belarus. *President of the Republic of Belarus*. 1994. URL: <https://president.gov.by/en/gosudarstvo/constitution> (дата звернення: 07.05.2022)].
- Courtney, W. & Haltzel, M. (2020, August 18). The West's Role in Belarus. *Rand Corporation / The Rand Blog Commentary*. Retrieved from <https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/08/the-wests-role-in-belarus.html> [in English]. [Courtney W., Haltzel M. The West's Role in Belarus. *Rand Corporation. The Rand Blog Commentary*. 2020, August 18. URL: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/08/the-wests-role-in-belarus.html> (дата звернення: 07.05.2022)].
- El Rajji, R. (2014). The Leaves of One Tree: Religious Minorities in Lebanon. *Minority Rights Group International: Briefing, 2/8*. Retrieved from <https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/mrg-briefing-religious-minorities-in-lebanon.pdf> [in English]. [El Rajji R. The Leaves of One Tree: Religious Minorities in Lebanon. *Minority Rights Group International: Briefing*. 2014. Vol.2, Is.8. URL: <https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/mrg-briefing-religious-minorities-in-lebanon.pdf> (дата звернення: 07.05.2022)].
- Franzese, R. (2013, January 13). Context matters: the challenge of multicausality, context-conditionality, and endogeneity for empirical evaluation of positive theory in comparative politics. In Boix, C. & Stokes. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Pp. 27–72). Retrieved from http://www.personal.umich.edu/~franzese/Franzese.MultiCausal.ContextCond.Endog.OxfHndbkCP_chap02.PROOFS.pdf [in English]. [Franzese R. Context matters: the challenge of multicausality, contextconditionality, and endogeneity for empirical evaluation of positive theory in comparative politics. In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics / Eds. by Boix C. Stokes*. 2013, January 13. P. 27–72. URL: http://www.personal.umich.edu/~franzese/Franzese.MultiCausal.ContextCond.Endog.OxfHndbkCP_chap02.PROOFS.pdf (дата звернення: 12.04.2022)].
- Haines-Young, J. (2015, August 24). What does Beirut Smell Like? From the Stench of Trash to Blood. *Al Arabiya English: Analysis*. Retrieved from <https://english.alarabiya.net/perspective/analysis/2015/08/24/What-does-Beirut-smell-like-From-the-stench-of-trash-to-blood> [in English]. [Haines-Young J. What does Beirut Smell Like? From the Stench of Trash to Blood. *Al Arabiya English: Analysis*. 2015. August 24. URL: <https://english.alarabiya.net/perspective/analysis/2015/08/24/What-does-Beirut-smell-like-From-the-stench-of-trash-to-blood> (дата звернення: 12.04.2022)].
- Kayem, H. (2014). The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement. *American University of Beirut: Digital Documentation Center*, 2/17. Retrieved from <https://www.civil-center.org/files/taif/The-Lebanese-Civil-War-and-the-Taif-Agreement---Hassan-Krayem.pdf> [in English]. [Kaye H. The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement. *American University of Beirut: Digital Documentation Center*. 2014. Vol.2, Is.17. URL: <https://www.civil-center.org/files/taif/The-Lebanese-Civil-War-and-the-Taif-Agreement---Hassan-Krayem.pdf> (дата звернення: 13.04.2022)].

- Kresin, O. (2011). Prominent Ukrainian comparativist P. F. Martynenko (to the 75th anniversary of the scientist). *International Union of Assistance to Justice*. Retrieved from <https://www.iauaj.net/node/649> [in Russian]. [Кресин А. Выдающийся украинский компаративист П. Ф. Мартыненко (к 75-летию ученого). *Международная Ассоциация содействия правосудию*. 2011. URL: <https://www.iauaj.net/node/649> (дата звернення: 13.04.2022)].
- Kropman, V. (2022, May 5). Evroparlament podderzhal evropejskiye perspektivy Moldovy. [The European Parliament Supported Moldova's European Prospects]. *DW/Top Stories*. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/ru/evroparlament-podderzhal-evropejskie-perspektivy-moldovy/a-61696188> [in Russian]. [Кропман В. Европарламент поддержал европейские перспективы Молдовы. *DW/Темы дня*. 2022, 5 травня. URL: <https://www.dw.com/ru/evroparlament-podderzhal-evropejskie-perspektivy-moldovy/a-61696188> (дата звернення: 13.04.2022)].
- Lebanon's Constitution of 1926 with Amendments through 2004. (2021, April 9). *Oxford University Press*. Translated by Shafik, F. & Awad, A. Retrieved from https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lebanon_2004.pdf?lang=en [in English]. [Lebanon's Constitution of 1926 with Amendments through 2004. *Oxford University Press* / Translated by Shafik F., Awad A.). 2021, April 9. URL: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lebanon_2004.pdf?lang=en (дата звернення: 13.04.2022)].
- Liubakova, H. (2020, September 16). Putin risks turning Belarus from natural ally to enemy. *Atlantic Council*. Retrieved from <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-risks-turning-belarus-from-natural-ally-to-enemy> [in English]. [Liubakova H. Putin risks turning Belarus from natural ally to enemy. *Atlantic Council*. 2020, September 16. URL: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-risks-turning-belarus-from-natural-ally-to-enemy> (дата звернення: 13.04.2022)].
- Martin, N. (2020, August 25). Belarus' Soviet-era economy still propped up by Moscow. *Deutsche Welle / Top Stories / Business*. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-soviet-era-economy-still-propped-up-by-moscow/a-54694876> [in English]. [Martin N. Belarus' Soviet-era economy still propped up by Moscow. *Deutsche Welle. Top Stories. Business*. 2020. August 25. URL: <https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-soviet-era-economy-still-propped-up-by-moscow/a-54694876> (дата звернення: 13.04.2022)].
- Nakonechna, E. (2022, May 17). 'Khezbollah' vtratyla bilshist v parlamenti livanu' [Hezbollah has lost its majority in Lebanon's parliament]. *DW/Top Stories*. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/uk/khezbollah-vtratyla-bilshist-v-parlamenti-livanu/a-61824059> [in Ukrainian]. [Наконечна Е. 'Хезболла' втратила більшість в парламенті Лівану. *DW/Політика й суспільство. Новини*. 2022, 17 травня. URL: <https://www.dw.com/uk/khezbollah-vtratyla-bilshist-v-parlamenti-livanu/a-61824059> (дата звернення: 13.04.2022)].
- Petallides, J. C. (2011). Cedars to the East: A Study of Modern Lebanon. *INQUIRIES. Social Sciences. Human arts & Humanities*, 3(12), 1/1. Retrieved from <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/603/cedars-to-the-east-a-study-of-modern-lebanon> [in English]. [Petallides J. C. Cedars to the East: A Study of Modern Lebanon. *INQUIRIES, Social Sciences, Human arts & Humanities*. 2011. Vol.3, No12. Pp. 1/1. URL: <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/603/cedars-to-the-east-a-study-of-modern-lebanon> (дата звернення: 13.04.2022)].
- Sichen, I. (2021, February 10). Ukraine and Moldova: Geopolitical Perspectives / Partners an Allies in the Post-Soviet-Space. *Borysfen Intel*. Retrieved from <https://bintel.org.ua/en/analytics/ukraina-i-moldova-geopolitichni-perspektivi> [in Ukrainian]. [Січень І. Україна і Молдова: геополітичні перспективи. Партнери і союзники пострадянського простору. *Борисфен Інтел*. 2021, 10 лютого. URL: <https://bintel.org.ua/analytics/ukraina-i-moldova-geopolitichni-perspektiv> (дата звернення: 13.04.2022)].
- Simpson, H. (2019, March 27). Anatomy of a Fraud: The Moldovan Parliamentary Elections. *Foreign Policy Research Institute: Eurasian Program*. Retrieved from <https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/03/anatomy-of-a-fraud-the-moldovan-parliamentary-elections> [in English]. [Simpson H. Anatomy of a Fraud: The Moldovan Parliamentary Elections. *Foreign Policy Research Institute: Eurasian Program*. 2019, March 27. URL: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/03/anatomy-of-a-fraud-the-moldovan-parliamentary-elections> (дата звернення: 13.04.2022)].
- Stafford, A. (2013, November 14). Comparative Analysis within Political Science. *E-International Relations*, 1/4. Retrieved from <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/44275> [in English]. [Stafford

- A. Comparative Analysis within Political Science. *E-International Relations*. 2013, November 14, 1/4. URL: <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/44275> (дата звернення: 13.04.2022)].
- The Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable. (2005). Republic. *Oxford University Press*. Retrieved from <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100415552> [in English]. [The Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable. Republic. *Oxford University Press*. 2005. URL: <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100415552> (дата звернення: 13.04.2022)]
- World Population Review. (2022). Republic Countries 2022. Retrieved from <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/republic-countries> [in English]. [World Population Review. Republic Countries 2022. URL: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/republic-countries> (дата звернення: 13.04.2022)].

Стаття надійшла до редакції 14.06.2022

Побле Д. К.

кафедра міжнародних відносин ОНУ імені І. І. Мечникова
к.32, Французький бул., 24/26, м. Одеса, 65058, Україна

ГРОМАДСЬКІ ПРОТЕСТИ У ЛІВАНІ ПРОТЯГОМ 2019–2021 РОКІВ: СТИСЛЕ ПОРІВНЯННЯ З МИРНИМИ ДЕМОНСТРАЦІЯМИ ТА ЗІБРАННЯМИ У МОЛДОВІ І БІЛОРУСІ

Резюме

Стаття присвячена дослідженню протестного руху трьох окремо взятих країнах, що мають республіканський державний устрій, але дуже відрізняються між собою з погляду історичних та культурних цінностей. Дослідження охоплює хронологічний період 2019–2021 років. Метою дослідження стало з'ясування загальних та відмінних ознак цих громадських виступів, а також прогноз їхнього ймовірного впливу на міжнародні відносини та геополітичні тенденції. Методика дослідження базувалася переважно на короткому компаративному аналізі трьох об'єктів дослідження. Стаття прагнула відзначити особливості протестних рухів у трьох країнах. Проведено коротке порівняння ситуації в Лівані, Молдові та Білорусі з урахуванням їхнього істеблішменту, політичної та економічної кризи, яка викликала протестні акції. Було виявлено деякі особливості, пов'язані з інтересами внутрішніх та зовнішніх політичних груп та їх впливом. Було зроблено обережний прогноз для передбачення розвитку ситуації в цих країнах, включаючи позиціонування ключових акторів регіону щодо процесів, що відбуваються у зазначених країнах та за їх межами у спробах змінити баланс сил на свою користь. Незважаючи на те, що основні хронологічні рамки охоплюють період 2019–2021 рр. робота зберігає свою актуальність у зв'язку з відсутністю фундаментальних досліджень на цю тему, і більшість інформації з цієї тематики посідає обмежену аналітику та повідомлення ЗМІ. Результати дослідження показали унікальність Лівану, цієї поліконфесійної арабської країни Східного Середземномор'я з давньою фінікійською історією, яка протягом останніх двох років зазнала чергової хвилі заворушень. У той же період у двох пострадянських країнах Східної Європи вибухнули масові акції протесту, викликані фальсифікацією підрахунку голосів виборців, корупцією та політичною мотивацією своїх урядів в умовах погіршення економічної ситуації.

Ключові слова: масові протести, фальсифікація виборів, корупція, громадські демонстрації та збори, істеблішмент, ключові актори.