

УДК 327(55:569.4)

Gergiieva Valeriia

Ph.D. in Political Sciences,

Research fellow at Odessa Centre for Nonproliferation,

Leading expert at the Centre of International Studies

Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University

Tel: +380931590990

E-mail: gergiieva17@gmail.com

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1658-3189>

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.18524/2707-5206.2021.34.237714>

Levinson Dana

3rd year International Relations student

Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University

Tel: +380964225229

E-mail: dana.levinson02@gmail.com

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.18524/2707-5206.2021.34.237714>

STRATEGIC CULTURE FENOMENA IN IRAN-ISRAEL RELATIONS

The current confrontation between the State of Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran is not an exceptionally new phenomenon; however, it is noticeable that escalation around the “Iran nuclear deal” makes this issue one of the most urgent on the current political agenda. This article focuses on countries’ strategic culture as both public and non-state actors see and respond to challenges and opportunities international system — which is the result of cultural perception. Iranian and Israeli strategic cultures have some similarities — consideration of which is necessary to understand the specifics of the relationship between the two states and Jerusalem’s possible response to a potential nuclearization of Tehran. Cultural details are often overlooked when we are trying to analyze the policy of a particular state, however, this analysis can provide an understanding of a particular country’s response to challenges and threats. Learning more about how and why actors use force in the system is an important topic to which strategic culture may provide some answers but the process of applying it is difficult. In this article, we overview historical preconditions of Iran-Israel relations, Israel’s specific view of its ambitions in the region, and nowadays escalation between two countries. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is still on the agenda between the two countries, while negotiations in Vienna continue, Iran increased its enrichment up to 60 percent — the highest level in Iranian history. Iranian nuclear program is a cornerstone in the US-Iran and Iran-Israel relations, but the strategic culture of Israel still cannot adopt improvement of relations between the US and Iran, as Iranian progress in its nuclear ambitions.

Key words: strategic culture, Iran-Iraq war, The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Israel, Iran, the US.

Introduction

Iran criticizes the international system, pointing to its injustice, and condemning the double standards applied by the United Nations and other in-

ternational organizations. Iran is seen as the bearer of revolutionary Islam, supporting radical Islamic movements throughout the Middle East. Iranian leaders believe that the fate of the ummah (Islamic community) depends on Iran's ability to transform into a world power capable of protecting and promoting the interests of that community. At the same time, the possession of significant reserves of hydrocarbons reinforces Tehran's existing ambitions, including the intention to establish its leadership in the region, which is often extrapolated to the military plane. The main battle for regional supremacy is between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which, along with Israel, is a major partner and ally of the United States. Nowadays increased confrontation between Iran and Israel could cause even more instability in the region, especially due to the nuclear issue which could transform Israel's nuclear policy and push Saudi Arabia to the nuclear side as well.

The aim of this research: to investigate the role of strategic culture of Israel and Iran on its policy in the region and define the role of the US on countries relations.

The methodology of the research. The methodological basis for studying the complex process of shaping Iran-Israel confrontation and the peculiarities of its practical implementation under different circumstances are the methods of their specific strategic culture. Strategic culture in security and international studies represents an attempt to integrate cultural influences about how actors within the international system made decisions regarding the use of force, so it could provide some answers. This article examines some particular features of Iranian and Israeli strategic cultures through historical and religious perspectives. First of all we focus on the Iran-Iraq war as one of the main conditions in formulating attitude to international organizations, countries in the region and change of its nuclear ambitions, as well as Islamic Revolution 1979 which formed a hostile perception of the West. Secondly, in our article we overview the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as an official documentary basis of the negotiations process which included the specific features of Iran's strategic culture. Nowadays negotiations in Vienna are overviewed as an example of a long going process between Iran, the West and interested sides in the Middle-East region.

The origins and main drivers of Israel's Strategic Culture

It is important to emphasise that Israel's strategic culture has been strongly impacted by the idea of "never again" (which has to some extent some similarities with the IRI case that will be discussed later). Thus, the development of nuclear capabilities was caused by a series of historical events that have profoundly shaped their national consciousness and have led the Jewish State to believe that without a nuclear arsenal, the very existence of this nation is threatened.

As former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin noted, the Jewish people cannot allow a second Holocaust, and that is why they cannot allow any enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against Jerusalem (Shai Feldman, 1997) — the principle that eventually became the basis of the so-called "Begin Doctrine". Therefore, the "one-bomb country" despite its short his-

tory, has extensive experience with preventive strikes, choosing offensive military strategy as the cornerstone of its very existence — due to its geopolitical location and the relatively small size of its territory (Sinovets, 2005). This was demonstrated in the cases with Iraq and Syria — when in 1981 the Operation “Opera” was performed (designed to destroy Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor) and in 2007 — the Operation “Orchard” (organized to destroy Syria’s alleged nuclear reactor).

Thus, the success of Israeli operations is due to the very nature of Israel Defence Forces (IDF) strategic doctrine, whose nature is defensive, while the tactics, which are used — offensive. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that Israeli strategic doctrine (2015) assumes deterrence, which would be adapted to each specific adversary, depending on the analysis of its capabilities and characteristics (Israel Defense Forces Strategy Document, 2015, p. 27).

It is noteworthy that the State of Israel puts deterrence itself at the center of its counterterrorism strategy, and its vision of Iran differs from that of Washington: according to G. Allison, unlike the United States, Jerusalem views the IRI as another armed group, against which it would be most effective to apply “patient, vigilant deterrence” rather than open confrontation. This is largely due to Iran’s geopolitical position and the location of its nuclear facilities. However, it was in November 2020 when Iranian Defense Minister Amir Khatami, who commented on the assassination of the “founder of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program”, said that “the criminal Americans have thousands of nuclear weapons, and the criminal Zionist regime has hundreds”, but “neither terror nor a stupid act will go unanswered by the Iranian people” (Maziar Motamed, 2020).

However, it was Carl von Clausewitz, who once said what would eventually become a winged expression: “War is a continuation of politics, only by other means”. Nevertheless, Jerusalem does not seek war — at least that is what is stated in IDF strategic doctrine. Therefore, another feature of the strategic culture of the Jewish State is the aforementioned principle of “seeking peace before resorting to war” — which is also influenced by the heritage of Judaism. The State of Israel does not seek war or confrontation, preferring, wherever possible, to pursue the path of diplomacy (here, it should be added, the issue is also complicated by the fact that there are no direct diplomatic contacts between Jerusalem and Tehran). As it is mentioned in the Israel Defense Forces Strategy Document, “Israel is a peaceful nation seeking to avoid conflict”. However, “if a conflict is imposed on the State of Israel, it will concentrate its capabilities and win”.

The origins and main drivers of Iran’s Strategic Culture

If we talk about strategic culture impact on Iran and its policy, it should firstly be noted that Iran is a country with Shiite direction of Islam. Shiism was formed under the complex historical conditions, because after the division of the Shiites were in the minority comparable to the Sunnis, and therefore for many centuries experienced persecution (Kireev, 2006, p. 85). Secondly, Iran’s colonial past should be taken under consideration as well, as

it has also influenced the perception of the international community. From the end of the 19th century in the face of increasing foreign penetration in Iran, the growth of national self-consciousness has begun. As a result of these events, as well as the rule of the Shah before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which was the result of cooperation with the West more than prosperity of the country and formed a negative attitude towards Western countries, especially the United States (Cheban, 2014, p. 75).

Thirdly, Iran has certain ambitions that should be taken into account, after all it is one of the richest energy countries in the world that forms an evocative desire to fight for leadership in the region. The main struggle for the leadership is underway between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which along with Israel are the major partners and allies of the United States. Therefore, in terms of Iran, nuclear weapons may be the most effective way to prove its status as the dominant regional power. The Islamic Republic of Iran has launched its own nuclear program only in 1985, at the height of the Iran-Iraq war, although initially Iran claimed that religious regulations prevented him from developing weapons of mass distribution (WMD), but the country's behavior shows that in the period of threat or fear in the future threat, the country closes eyes on any religious institutions or previous beliefs. During the Iran-Iraq war, Ayatollah Khomeini believed that the use of chemical weapons was forbidden by Islam and condemned any WMD, but changed his mind in the second half of the 1980s against the background of fears that Iraq was preparing to use chemical weapons against Iranian cities (Eisenstadt, 2011, p. 1).

Thus, the war with Iraq has not only “left deep wounds in the Iranian national psyche” but, to some extent, caused an ingrained distrust of international arms control treaties (which Iraq had actually signed) as well as of international organizations such as the United Nations (Michael Eisenstadt, 2011, p. 5). The determination not to allow a repeat of the bitter experience, when virtually the entire world turned a blind eye to Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons, has driven Tehran to actively develop its nuclear program.

At the same time, it is worth noting that Tehran's hostility towards Jerusalem was not caused by a historically direct confrontation between the two states, but by the hostility in relations between the IRI and the United States — while Washington is perceived by the Iranian clergy as the main threat to the very existence of the regime, it perceives Israel as the main ally of an American state seeking to spread “imperialism” in the Middle East (Dalia Dassa Kaye, Alireza Nader, Parisa Roshan, 2011, p. 55–56).

Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that: “Nothing in Iran is black and white; ambiguity and shades of grey rule.” (Michael Eisenstadt, 2011, p. 1).

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actions: from 2013 till 2021

In 2013, the second presidential term of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was radical in his moods and statements, ended. It was expected that in 2013 the new president would be a candidate more loyal to the Supreme Leader. However, the election was won by moderate politician Hassan Rouhani, whose main campaign slogan was dialogue with the West on Iran's nuclear

program. Therefore, it can be stated that economic pressure on Iran has had a positive effect on the change of political power. It is worth recalling that the first changes were observed after the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, when many citizens protested against it, as they were dissatisfied with ineffective economic policies and increasing isolation of Iran. So, if another tough politician won the 2013 election, the social unrest could have become much larger, which in some ways led to fair elections in the country.

The new President understood the importance of changing economic policy, which provided for the normalization of relations with the United States and the EU, the lifting of economic sanctions and the development of a free market economy. Even the Supreme Leader acknowledged the urgent need for the country to pursue a new economic policy, more rational and nationally oriented, rather than confrontational, which harmed Iran's national interests. Ayatollah Khamenei understood that if international sanctions were not eased, it would lead to a further deterioration of the socio-economic situation, a reduction in the prestige of the government and possibly a social explosion. Therefore, Ayatollah Khamenei apparently agreed to President Rouhani and his team to begin negotiations with the West.

Following the meeting in Geneva in November 2013, the parties agreed on a Joint Action Plan — a compromise agreement between Iran and the P5 + 1 countries, under which Tehran agreed to the following conditions:

- to stop the enrichment of uranium higher than 5 % and to liquidate all its uranium reserves, enriched to 20 % (Iran undertook to convert the second half into the form of uranium oxide, which is not suitable for further enrichment and military use) (Iran could enrich uranium, 2019);
- freeze the production of new uranium enrichment centrifuges and the amount of enriched uranium reserves;
- temporarily suspend the construction of the Erak reactor, which can produce armed plutonium;
- provide IAEA inspectors with wide access to Iranian nuclear facilities (Interim nuclear agreement, 2013, p. 23).

In exchange, P5 + 1 agreed to partially ease the sanctions regime (approximately \$ 7 billion) and recognized Iran's right to uranium enrichment, which remained a fundamentally important point for Iran to reach an agreement with Western countries.

It was an interim agreement, a platform on which the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actions (JCPOA) was developed in July 2015. The signing of the JCPOA is one of President Barack Obama's greatest achievements, although his successor, President Trump, has questioned that achievement. The agreement was concluded for 15 years. According to it, Iran has agreed to liquidate its reserves of medium-enriched uranium, reduce its reserves of low-enriched uranium by 98 % and reduce the number of its gas centrifuges by about two-thirds within 13 years. Iran has pledged to enrich uranium to only 3.67 % and not to build any new heavy water reactors. To monitor and verify Iran's compliance with the agreement, the IAEA gained regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities.

Reaching a nuclear deal with Iran has had a number of positive consequences. First of all, for the first time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the capture of American diplomats in Tehran, Presidents Rouhani and Obama had a telephone conversation, and this fact was a great historical achievement (Powers, 2020). In addition, the issue of Iran's nuclear program remained unresolved for decades before the signing of the JCPOA, and it was hard to believe that this issue could be resolved given the Iranian's lack of contact and uncompromisingness. Another positive aspect of the agreement was the fact that Iran immediately began to comply with the terms of the agreement, in particular, IAEA inspectors gained access to all nuclear facilities in Iran. In its reports, the IAEA confirmed that Iran was complying with the terms of the treaty and that there were no indications of further nuclear weapons activities.

On the other hand, the positive impact of signing the JCPOA was rather limited. First, the United States and Iran still did not trust each other. The Iranian side has always stressed that it will be ready to cooperate with Western countries only on nuclear issues, but this cooperation will not address regional issues or issues of the Iranian space and missile industry, which continued to develop after the signing of the JCPOA without any restrictions. In addition, Iran continued to support its allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, which it considered opponents of the United States. As some analysts have warned, Iran has used the money received after the lifting of economic sanctions and the opening of frozen accounts in international banks. This situation drew criticism of the agreement, as it obliged the United States to lift sanctions on Iran, although the regime in Tehran continued to be anti-American.

The election of President Trump with his slogan "America above all else" led to the withdrawal of the United States from the treaty and the strengthening of sanctions against Iran, which was interpreted as protecting the interests of Washington and its allies in the region. US-Iranian relations have been further complicated by strikes on Saudi oil facilities, with the United States seeing it as an "act of war" and blaming Iran, although Tehran has denied any role in the attacks, which have hit the kingdom's two most important oil facilities. 265].

Trump's policy of reinstating sanctions, especially on the energy, shipping and financial sectors, has halted foreign investment and reduced oil exports by 90 %, which is Iran's most important source of income. The IRI president said US sanctions had cost Iran \$ 200 billion in lost foreign revenue and investment over the past two years. "Iran would have earned \$ 200 billion in surplus revenue... if the country had not been drawn into an economic war," Hassan Rouhani said.

After the US withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018 and the imposition of sanctions against Iran, Tehran waited another year for the situation to change, remaining in the JCPOA. It was not until May 2019 that Tehran also decided to gradually begin its withdrawal from the JCPOA.

After President Biden had won the elections, there was an expectation that negotiations on Iran would complete successfully, but the US-Iranian game who would give up their positions first, slowed down the negotiations pro-

cess. Nevertheless, the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency agreed to extend a deal for monitoring Iran's nuclear activities for one month and the possibility that the sides would agree is becoming higher.

The U. S. is still not directly participating in the talks, but the U. S. special envoy for Iran, Rob Malley, has been in Vienna for previous rounds and is in touch with representatives from participants Germany, France, Britain, Russia and China (Round five of Iran Nuclear Talks, 2021).

Iran-Israel relations: current stage

It should be noted that relations between the Israel and Iran also deteriorated markedly when, after a brief pause caused by the Iran–Iraq War, the IRI returned to developing its own nuclear capabilities — moving away from the idea of developing a peaceful atom (carried out under Pahlavi) to develop its own nuclear weapons.

While Israel is well-known for its “policy of nuclear opacity”, for Iran “opacity” can be considered a central feature of foreign policy, skillfully used by the political regime. Tehran, deftly juggling with fundamental religious principles, turns them into the vector it wants, claiming, in the end, “what others claim for themselves, and demands of others what is demanded of it”. For instance, “in response to U. S. demands that Iran not produce nuclear weapons, Iran demanded that the U. S. give up its nuclear arms” (Michael Eisenstadt, 2011, p. 4).

It is important to mention that Israel, which has chosen the policy of “nuclear opacity” as its cornerstone, has been remaining one of the most ardent opponents of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action concluded in Vienna in 2015 by the EU/EU+3 and Islamic Republic of Iran, and today has its own views on concluding a new treaty with Tehran. However, to understand Jerusalem's position on the possible nuclearization of Tehran and/or the potential conclusion of a new nuclear agreement (or a return to the terms of the old one) by the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, the PRC, Germany and the IRI, it is necessary to take into consideration the key positions of Iranian and Israeli strategic cultures.

Besides, today the issue of returning to the terms of the “nuclear deal” is relevant as never before on the political agenda. If the events of 2020 (the murders of Qasem Soleimani and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh) served as a catalyst for taking more decisive steps towards the development of nuclear weapons by Iran (this is confirmed by Majlis adoption of the ‘Strategic Action Plan to lift sanctions and protect the interests of the Iranian people’ and Iran's withdrawal from the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), the sabotage at the Natanz nuclear facility (for which the Iranian regime accused the Jewish State) and Tehran's subsequent announcement of its intention to enrich uranium to 60 % can be considered a tipping point in Israeli-Iranian relations.

However, there is no doubt that every new step by Iran in the development of its nuclear program will cause an immediate reaction from Israel. For example, at the end of January 2021 IDF Chief of the General Staff Aviv Ko-

chavinoted that he ordered to prepare plans to attack the nuclear facilities of Iran in order to prevent the Islamic Republic from obtaining nuclear weapons, while stressing that it is solely up to the government to implement these plans or not (Sinovets, 2005).

However, it is important to note that such statements are not an exclusively new phenomenon for Jerusalem. For example, back in 2005 the potential possibility was mentioned of an air-ground military operation by the Israeli military against Iranian nuclear facilities in the event of absolute futility of Iranian-Israeli dialogue.

Furthermore, neither the escalated situation in the Gaza Strip is conducive to “détente” — it is important to emphasize that the operation “Guardian of the Walls” performed by the Israel Defense Forces did not have as its main goal the complete destruction of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but the destabilization of the terrorist organizations and destruction (at least partial) of their infrastructures and facilities. However, the massive shelling of the entire territory of Israel, including the central cities of the Jewish state committed from Gaza, as well as several rockets fired from Lebanon, have created noticeable tension along the southern and the northern borders. However, despite the fact that Islamic Republic of Iran is “well-known” for its active support of Hamas in its struggle against the very existence of the Israel, despite the fact that it was on Al-Quds Day when the Iranian spiritual leader Ali Khamenei urged Muslims to continue their fighting against Jewish state, which is not a “state” at all but a “terrorist garrison” oppressing the Palestinians, it is doubtful that in the heat of negotiations in Vienna the IRI will openly confront the Jewish State. We are facing the ongoing confrontation between the two states — and this issue becomes more and more relevant with the approach of presidential elections in both countries: on the 2^d of June, 2021 they will take place in Israel and on the 18th of June, 2021 — in Iran. It is important to mention that despite the fact that Israeli president has always been considered the politically much less influential figure as the prime-minister, he is granted a power to “pardon convicted criminals and exercise clemency by reducing or commuting sentences” (Basic Laws of Israel) — and it is extremely important in case of ongoing Netanyahu’s trial.

However, we should not forget that the real power in the Islamic Republic of Iran belongs to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has been in power for more than a quarter of a century. And while in Washington, “each successive president seems intent on reversing the direction of his predecessor”, in Tehran conservative presidents may be replaced by moderate reformers, proclaimed radical policies may be replaced by more liberal ones calling for a “dialogue of civilizations” and stressing the need for diplomatic relations with the West — and yet “Iranian presidents are probably responsible for the state’s tactical steps, while it is Khamenei who shapes its strategy”.

Conclusions

As noted at the outset of this paper, Iranian and Israeli strategic cultures have some similarities — consideration of which is necessary to understand

the specifics of the relationship between the two states and Jerusalem's possible response to a potential nuclearization of Tehran.

The idea of "no choice" is, in principle, the key to understanding the strategic culture of Israel (and, as noted, Iran) — a dark, mournful imprint left by Holocaust and the Arabs' refusal to accept the Jewish state. It is enough to recall the words of Ernst David Bergman, the "father of Israel's nuclear program", who noted that: "there is no man in this country who does not fear nuclear war, and there is no one who does not hope that, despite everything, logic will rule in the world of tomorrow. But... I cannot forget that the Holocaust took the Jewish people by surprise. The Jewish people cannot afford such an illusion a second time". Thus, remembering the sad experience of the last century, during the time of David Ben-Gurion, Menachem Begin, and now with Binyamin Netanyahu governing the state, this idea remains dominant in Israel's foreign policy.

Furthermore, The JCPOA is still on the agenda and the results of negotiations in Vienna will have direct influence for the Middle-East region. Of course Trump's policy of pressure on Iran has significantly reduced the prospects of reaching any new agreement with Iran and virtually nullified the achievements of his predecessors. At the moment, Iran has maintained that for it to return to the deal, the U. S. must first lift its sanctions, while the U. S. says Iran must first return to compliance with the deal's terms.

With presidential elections in Iran in 2021, the escalation of Iranian-Israeli relations caused by Israeli involvement in sabotage at the Natanz nuclear facility, and negotiations in Vienna not yielding (at least for the moment) fruitful results, does not help to resolve tensions in the Middle East. However, it is worth noting that the explosion at the Natanz nuclear facility has not stopped the negotiation process in Vienna, but, vice versa, has every chance to become an impetus for its further intensification. This is primarily due to the fact that conservative circles in the IRI, which initially opposed the nuclear deal, are holding increasingly strong positions nowadays.

On the other hand, even if the JCPOA exists, Iran's regional policy and missile program will still be a major challenge to US and European security. At the same time, the level of tension with Iran will be lower with the JCPOA, and the prospects for negotiations on regional security and missile program development will be higher. Moreover, if the United States had not violated the nuclear agreement, transatlantic unity would not have suffered so much.

However, it is worth noting that another problem is that even without starting wars, Iran has been (and still is) quite successful in provoking aggression from its neighbors — and Israel in particular. For Israel (and other U. S. allies, especially for Saudi Arabia), not only the "nuclear issue" of Iran remains extremely important, but also the problem of Iran's sway in the region, which consists of active support for terrorist (both anti-Israeli and pro-Shiite) groups and characterized by active interference in the political life of de-jure sovereign states.

Despite the loud statements of the Israeli military, it is unlikely that the Jewish State today would dare to take open military action against the Is-

lamic Republic, which, however, is officially recorded in the IDF Strategy as an enemy of the state. The natural characteristics of the Shiite state and the location of its nuclear facilities make potential strikes against the latter by the Israeli military technically quite difficult.

Nevertheless, it is likely that the Gulf states, being well aware of Iran's nuclear ambitions, will choose to “balance the nuclear imbalance”. In other words, the possible nuclearization of Iran will most likely entail the development of nuclear weapons by the Arab states of the region — primarily Saudi Arabia, whose political leadership has already — amid the growing threat from Tehran — gone for a rapprochement (although not yet formal) with the Israeli government.

That is why it is crucial for the new Biden-Harris administration to consider the positions of its Middle Eastern allies, which, in turn, puts them in a rather difficult position — negotiations with Tehran must be conducted with maximum diplomatic precision and caution so that neither side crosses the point of no return. At the same time, both the political leadership of the Islamic Republic and the political leadership of the United States stand firm on their positions, which do not involve any concessions to the other side.

References

- Allison, G. (2016, August 8). *Why ISIS Fears Israel*. ANALYSIS& OPINIONS — The National Interest. *Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-isis-fears-israel>. [in English].
- Cheban, O. Ya. (2014). *Yadernii vibir Iranu: teoretichnii ta mizhnarodno-politichni aspekti (Iran's nuclear choice: theoretical and international political aspects)*. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). The Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Institute of International Relations. Kyiv. [in Ukrainian].
- Eisenstadt, M. (2011). *The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Operational and Policy Implications*. Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University. Monograph Series, No. 1, August. Retrieved from [http://edocs.nps.edu/2014/May/MESM %20No1, %20August %202011 %20'The %20](http://edocs.nps.edu/2014/May/MESM%20No1,%20August%202011%20'The%20)[in English].
- Eisenstadt, M. (2014, April). What Iran's Chemical Past Tells Us About Its Nuclear Future. *The Washington Institute for Nuclear East Policy: Research Notes*, 17. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-irans-chemical-past-tells-us-about-its-nuclear-future> [in English].
- Eisenstadt, M. & Khalaj M. (2011, September). *Nuclear Fatwa: Religion and Politics in Iran's Proliferation Strategy*. Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus, 115. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus115.pdf>. [in English].
- Feldman, S. (1997). *Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.[in English].
- Heistein, A. & Zimmt R. (2020, May). A New Iran Nuclear Deal? Not so Fast. *ALARABIYA*. Retrieved from <https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/A-new-Iran-nuclear-deal-Not-so-fast-Ari-Heistein-Raz-Zimmt-for-site.pdf> [in English].
- Interim nuclear agreement between Iran and six powers. (2013, November 24). *Reuters*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-agreement-text-idUSBRE9AN0FS20131124> [in English].
- Iran could enrich uranium to 20 percent within four days: atomic chief. (2019, January 15). *Reuters*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-salehi-idUSKC-N1P9239> [in English].

- Israel Defense Forces Strategy Document. (2015). Retrieved from <https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/04/IDF-Strategy.pdf>. [in English].
- Israeli military draws up new plans against Iran, top commander says. (2021). *Al-Monitor*. THE PULSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST, January 27. Retrieved from <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/01/aviv-kochavi-israel-iran-nuclear-deal-revise-attack> [in English].
- Kaye, D. D., Nader, A. & Roshan P. (2011). *Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry*. The RAND National Defense Research Institute. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1143osd>. [in English].
- Kireev, A. V. (2006). *Osobennosti ogranichennoi demokraticizacii v Irane: 1989–2005 (Features of Limited Democratization in Iran: 1989–2005)*. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Russian Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation. Voronezh. [in Russian].
- Khan, Z. & Aziz, M. J. (2018). The Impact of Conflicting Middle Eastern Strategic Cultures on the geopolitics of the region. *NDU Journal*. Retrieved from https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/ndu-journal/NDU-Journal-2018/18-The-Impact-of-Conflicting.pdf. [in English].
- Motamed, M. (2020, November 20). Iran buries slain nuclear scientists, promises retaliation. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/30/iran-buries-assassinated-scientist-amid-promises-of-retaliation>. [in English].
- Powers, M. (2020, September 21). On Snapback Sanctions. *The Iran Primer*. Retrieved from <https://iranprimer.usip.org/index.php/blog/2020/sep/21/major-powers-snapback-sanctions>. [in English].
- Round five of Iran Nuclear Talks Opens in Vienna. (2021, May 25). *Voanews.com*. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/europe/round-five-iran-nuclear-talks-opens-vienna>. [in English].
- Sinovets, P. (2014). Tri rossijskikh mifa ob Irane. (Three Russian Myths about the Iran Republic). *Republic*. January 9. Retrieved from <https://republic.ru/posts/1/1041313> [in Russian].
- Sinovets, P. (2005). *Yadernoe sderzhivanie na Blizhnem Vostoke v kontekste irano-izrajskoi konfrontacii (Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East in the Context of the Iranian-Israeli Confrontation)*. *CentrAzia*. April 4. Retrieved from <https://centrasia.org/newsA.php?st=1112593800> [in Russian].

Список використаної літератури

- Киреев А. В. Особенности ограниченной демократизации в Иране: 1989–2005 годы: дис. ... канд. полит. наук: 23.00.02 / Российская академия государственной службы при президенте Российской Федерации. Воронеж, 2006. 170 с.
- Синовец П. Три российских мифа об Иране. *Republic*. 2014, январь 9. URL: <https://republic.ru/posts/1/1041313> (дата звернення: 12.03.2021).
- Синовец П. Ядерное сдерживание на Ближнем Востоке в контексте ирано-израильской конфронтации. *Центр Азия*. 2005, апрель 4. URL: <https://centrasia.org/newsA.php?st=1112593800> (дата звернення: 12.03.2021).
- Чебан О. Я. Ядерний вибір Ірану: теоретичний та міжнародно-політичні аспекти: дис. ... канд. політ наук: 23.00.04 / Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка, Інститут міжнародних відносин. Київ, 2014. 210 с.
- Allison G. Why ISIS Fears Israel. ANALYSIS & OPINIONS — The National Interest. Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. August 8, 2016. URL: <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-isis-fears-israel> (дата звернення: 12.03.2021).
- Eisenstadt M. The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Operational and Policy Implications. Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University, Monograph Series. 2011. No. 1, August. URL: [http://edocs.nps.edu/2014/May/MESM %20No1, %20August %202011 %20 'The %20](http://edocs.nps.edu/2014/May/MESM%20No1,%20August%202011%20'The%20) (дата звернення: 12.03.2021).
- Eisenstadt M. What Iran's Chemical Past Tells Us About Its Nuclear Future. *The Washington Institute for Nuclear East Policy: Research Notes*. 2014. Vol. 17. 20 p.
- Eisenstadt M., Khalaji M. Nuclear Fatwa: Religion and Politics in Iran's Proliferation Strategy. *Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus*. 2011. № 115. URL: <https://www>.

- washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus115.pdf (дата звернення: 12.03.2021).
- Feldman S. Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997. 358 p.
- Heistein A., Zimmt R. A new Iran nuclear deal? Not so fast. *ALARABIYA*. May 2020. URL: <https://english.alarabiya.net/views/news/middle-east/2020/05/23/A-new-Iran-nuclear-deal-Not-so-fast> (дата звернення: 12.03.2021).
- Interim nuclear agreement between Iran and six powers. Reuters. 2013. 24 November. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-agreement-text-idUSBRE9AN0FS20131124> (дата звернення: 12.03.2021).
- Iran could enrich uranium to 20 percent within four days: atomic chief. Reuters. 2019. 15 January. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-salehi-idUSKCN1P9239> (дата звернення: 13.04.2021).
- Israel Defense Forces Strategy Document, 2015. URL: <https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/04/IDF-Strategy.pdf> (дата звернення: 12.03.2021).
- Israeli military draws up new plans against Iran, top commander says. *Al-Monitor*. THE PULSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST. 27 January 2021. URL: <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/01/aviv-kochavi-israel-iran-nuclear-deal-revise-attack> (дата звернення: 12.03.2021).
- Kaye D. D., Nader A., Roshan P. Israel, and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry. The RAND National Defense Research Institute. 2011. URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1143osd> (дата звернення: 12.03.2021).
- Khan Z., Aziz M. J. The Impact of Conflicting Middle Eastern Strategic Cultures on the geopolitics of the region. *NDU Journal* 2018. URL: https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/ndu-journal/NDU-Journal-2018/18-The-Impact-of-Conflicting.pdf (дата звернення: 14.04.2021).
- Motamed M. Iran buries slain nuclear scientists, promises retaliation. *Al Jazeera*. 2020. 30 November. URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/30/iran-buries-assassinated-scientist-amid-promises-of-retaliation> (дата звернення: 14.03.2021).
- Powers M. On Snapback Sanctions. *The Iran Primer*. 2020. 21 September. URL: <https://iranprimer.usip.org/index.php/blog/2020/sep/21/major-powers-snapback-sanctions> (дата звернення: 13.04.2021).
- Round five of Iran Nuclear Talks Opens in Vienna. 25 May, 2021 URL: <https://www.voanews.com/europe/round-five-iran-nuclear-talks-opens-vienna> (дата звернення: 12.03.2021).

Стаття надійшла до редакції 01.06.21

Гергієва В. О.

Центр міжнародних досліджень, центр з питань нерозповсюдження
Одеський національний університет імені І. І. Мечникова
к. 32, Французький бул., 24/26, м. Одеса, 65058, Україна

Левінсон Д. М.

студентка 3-го курсу спеціальності «міжнародні відносини»
Одеський національний університет імені І. І. Мечникова
к. 32, Французький бул., 24/26, м. Одеса, 65058, Україна

ФЕНОМЕН СТРАТЕГІЧНОЇ КУЛЬТУРИ В ІРАНО-ІЗРАЇЛЬСКИХ ВІДНОСИНАХ

Резюме

Нинішнє протистояння між країною Ізраїль та Ісламською Республікою Іран не є надзвичайно новим явищем; однак помітно, що ескалація навколо іранської ядерної угоди робить це питання одним із найактуальніших на поточному політичному порядку денному. Ця стаття зосереджується на феномені стратегічної культури Ісламської Республіки Іран і Держави Ізраїль, оскільки як державні, так і недержавні

ні актори бачать та реагують на виклики та можливості міжнародної системи — це результат сприйняття культури.

Іранська та ізраїльська стратегічні культури мають деякі подібності — врахування яких необхідно для розуміння особливостей взаємовідносин між двома державами та можливої реакції Єрусалима на потенційну нуклеаризацію Тегерана. Особливості стратегічної культури часто не помічаються, коли ми намагаємося проаналізувати політику певної держави, однак саме цей аналіз може надати розуміння реакції конкретної країни на політичні виклики та загрози. Дізнатися більше про те, як і чому актори застосовують силу, є важливим елементом, на який стратегічна культура може дати деякі відповіді.

У цій статті ми розглядаємо історичні передумови ірано-ізраїльських відносин, конкретний погляд Ізраїлю та Ірану на власні амбіції в регіоні та сучасну ескалацію між двома країнами. Спільний всеосяжний план дій досі залишається на порядку денному у відносинах між двома країнами, в той час як переговори у Відні тривають, Іран збільшив збагачення урану до 60 відсотків — найвищий рівень в історії Ірану. Іранська ядерна програма є наріжним каменем у відносинах США — Іран та Іран — Ізраїль, але Держава Ізраїль, як і раніше, не може прийняти ні поліпшення відносин між США та Іраном, ні «прогрес» ядерних амбіцій Ірану.

Ключові слова: стратегічна культура, ірано-іракська війна, Спільний всеосяжний план дій (СВПД), Ізраїль, Іран, США.

Гергиева В. А.

Центр международных исследований, центр по вопросам нераспространения
Одесский национальный университет имени И. И. Мечникова
к. 32, Французский бул., 24/26, г. Одесса, 65058, Украина

Левинсон Д. М.

студентка 3-го курса специальности «международные отношения»
Одесский национальный университет имени И. И. Мечникова
к. 32, Французский бул., 24/26, г. Одесса, 65058, Украина

ФЕНОМЕН СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОЙ КУЛЬТУРЫ В ИРАНО-ИЗРАИЛЬСКИХ ОТНОШЕНИЯХ

Резюме

Нынешняя конфронтация между государством Израиль и Исламской Республикой Иран не новое явление; однако очевидно, что эскалация вокруг иранской «ядерной сделки» делает этот вопрос одним из наиболее актуальных на текущей политической повестке дня.

Эта статья фокусируется на исключительных чертах стратегической культуры как Государства Израиль, так и Исламской Республики Иран, поскольку как государственные, так и негосударственные субъекты видят и реагируют на вызовы и возможности международной системы — результат культурного восприятия. У иранской и израильской стратегических культур есть некоторое сходство, рассмотрение которого необходимо для понимания специфики отношений между двумя государствами и возможного ответа Иерусалима на потенциальную нуклеаризацию Тегерана.

Особенности и специфика стратегической культуры часто упускаются из виду, когда мы пытаемся проанализировать политику конкретного государства, однако

именно этот полноценный анализ способен дать понимание реакции конкретной страны на политические вызовы и угрозы.

В этой статье мы рассматриваем исторические предпосылки ирано-израильских отношений, особый взгляд Израиля и Ирана на свои собственные амбиции в регионе и нынешнюю эскалацию отношений между двумя государствами. В то время как Совместный всеобъемлющий план действий все еще стоит на повестке дня между двумя странами, а переговоры в Вене продолжаются, Исламская Республика Иран увеличила обогащение урана до 60 процентов — самого высокого уровня в истории Ирана.

Иранская ядерная программа является краеугольным камнем в отношениях США и Ирана и Ирана и Израиля, однако, Государство Израиль все еще не может принять ни заметное улучшение отношений между США и Ираном, ни «прогресс» ядерных амбиций Ирана.

Ключевые слова: стратегическая культура, ирано-иракская война, Совместный всеобъемлющий план действий (СВПД), Израиль, Иран, США.