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## THE ESSENCE OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE: FROM THE THIRD ROME TO THE RUSSIAN WORLD

The article is dedicated to the exploration of the Russian strategic culture and its influence on the major foreign and security policy trends of the Russian Federation. In particular, we suggest dividing Russian strategic culture into the three domains, taking roots from the historic, geographic, and religious foundations of the Moscow state. Those are, first, the Third Rome doctrine, having laid the background for the Russian imperial messianism, the immanent rivalry with the West as well as the Russian World idea and the further annexation of Crimea. Second, the “gathering lands” principle added the sacral meaning to the idea of strategic depth and the territory of Russia. As the result, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the enlargement of NATO to the East became the most painful episodes in Russian history, causing the reaction, which led to the confrontational role of Russia in the international system. And “the besieged fortress” principle serves as the element of integrating the Russian state and society as it is based on the idea that only the existence of rivals makes Russia the great state.

**Key words:** strategic culture, the Third Rome doctrine, nuclear orthodoxy, Russian world, Crimea annexation, NATO enlargement.

### Introduction

The understanding of the Russian Federation’s strategic culture became quite relevant since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the beginning of the hybrid conflict in eastern Ukraine, which involved not only Russia and Ukraine but the entire Euro-Atlantic world. After all, a direct, albeit

disguised by various proxy mechanisms, attack on one of the fundamental concepts- “inviolability of borders”, being the cornerstone of the international system after the second world war, has demonstrated that Europe is still not ready to adequately perceive the “Russian threat”. The roots of this problem come not from the inability of the West to defend itself conventionally, but rather from a lack of understanding of the strategic culture, the collective unconscious of the rival, which himself, time after time, challenges the West.

The purpose of this article is to identify the key characteristics of Russian strategic culture in the context of its evolution from basic values to the modern foundations of the foreign policy worldview.

### **Strategic culture phenomenon and methodology**

The research of the state’s strategic culture has become actual for the international practice relatively long ago. The first time this issue was researched by Jack Snyder in the article, dedicated to the Soviet strategic culture, analyzing it in the nuclear deterrence theory framework. At that moment Snyder called strategic culture as a “set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioral patterns with regard to nuclear strategy”, which have become one of the first attempts to interpret the state’s nuclear behavior coming from its cultural background (Snyder, 1977).

Academically the idea of strategic culture comes from constructivism, which contributes significantly to the neorealist explanation of the states’ security behavior especially in cases, coming out of the usual threat-based analysis methodology. Here the idea of rationality is explained by the peculiarities of the states’ national strategic cultures, which is essential for understanding the main aims and phobias of the state on the strategic level.

The methodology of the research is based on a range of tools. In particular, we analyze Russian history and foreign policy through the toolkit of strategic culture. The latter can be defined as a “set of shared beliefs, assumptions and models of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups and which determine appropriate ends and means of achieving national security objectives” (Johnson, Kartchner & Larsen, 2009, p. 9). To achieve this goal we used methods, revealing strategic culture in the most appropriate way. First, it is a historical analysis to explore the Russian experience regarding the circumstances of its foundation and religious development. Second, content analysis studying texts of the Russian official documents, including Military Doctrine of 2000, 2010, and 2014 as well as the Fundamentals of Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence State Policy, the President’s Speech to the Federal Assembly, etc. Also, we have involved system analysis to present the set of the received results viewing strategic culture as a comprehensive and interdependent system.

In this regard, we perceive the Russian state as the combination of the physical body, the spiritual content (or the soul), and the self-preservation instinct aimed at retaining its unique identity intact in the globalizing world. In practical terms, we associate the body of the state with its physical creation,

which is called “the gathering of lands” in the Russian case. The spiritual foundation of the Russian state rests on the awareness of its messianic role based on the Third Rome ideology. And finally, the self-preservation instinct is implied in the confrontation of Russia with the Other (which is mainly the West) being the key driver of the Russian state’s internal consolidation. There “the besieged fortress” worldview comes.

Previous studies. As far as the term strategic culture was born within the strategic narrative, it is not surprising that the most outstanding pieces on the essence of strategic culture defining the main features of phenomenon come from the nuclear domain. The most outstanding general works in this field belong to C. Gray (1999), J. Johnson, K. Kartchner and J. Larsen (2009), D. Howlett (2006), J. Knopf (2008), and J. Lantis (2002), (2009).

The Russian — centric dimension is presented by mostly Russian studies, where, exploring Russian national peculiarities we rely on the works of F. Ermarth (2009), and I. Facon (2012). Special attention should be paid to the nuclear orthodoxy studies outlining the roots of Russian strategic culture in its religious framework. Here the writings of M. Engstrom (2014) and D. Adamsky (2019) should be mentioned.

Approaching the problem chronologically and also paying the tribute to the highest role of the “spiritual” in Russia’s strategic culture we would like to structure the article starting from the “soul” of the Russian state, then pay attention to the creation of its “physical” body and at last stop at the consolidating principle of the general policy.

### **Moscow as the Third Rome**

It is no secret that the adoption of Orthodox Christianity in ancient Rus’ was, among other things, a cultural and political move by Prince Vladimir. By this decision, he had not only successfully connected himself to the pan-European Christian matrix, but also had declared a kind of claim to the continuity of the Byzantine civilization within the framework of the Ruthenian project. After all, Kievan Rus, unlike the Bulgarians, was rather a barbarian federate, a full-fledged ally, than a vassal or dependent on Tsaregrad. However, after the invasion of the Chingizids and the actual liquidation of Kyiv statehood as such, its claims to the Byzantine succession were irrevocably and definitively lost. Moreover, the situation changed even more drastically in the 15th century, when the Byzantine Empire was destroyed and absorbed by the Ottoman Turks. Virtually the entire Orthodox world lost its political center, becoming very easy prey to the Catholic (European) world and the Islamic world (the Ottoman Empire). One of the few states that had withstood that blow without any particular consequences was the Grand Principate of Moscow. In 1511, the monk Phylotheus wrote the letter to Basil III claiming that Moscow could become the last hope of Orthodox Christianity: “The Church of Rome fell for its heresy; the gates of the second Rome Constantinople were hewn down by the axes of infidel Turks; but the Church of Moscow, the church of the new Rome shines brighter than the sun in the whole Universe... two Romes had fallen but the third stands fast; a fourth cannot be... Thou [Basil] art the one

universal sovereign of all the Christian folk...Thy kingdom shall not be given to another” (Cited by Pulcini, 2015, p. 89).

Remaining de-facto the only major Orthodox state in Eurasia, Moscow adopted the idea of itself as the Third Rome, as the defender of the true Christianity, as a force that can repel both Catholics and Muslims, and reunite all Orthodox states under its rule, seems quite natural in these circumstances. The fact that the blood of the Paleolog dynasty, the last ruling house of Byzantium, ran in the veins of the Moscow princes added to the credibility of the hypothesis. Initially, the concept of the third Rome arose as a purely religious, eschatological idea in the framework of Moscow Orthodoxy. However, already under Ivan III, recognized in Europe as “emperor of the Russians” this concept is becoming more and more important politically.

The concept itself was given a profound eschatological justification. It was based on the story of the Apocalypse of John, “the woman clothed in the sun”. Russian theologians interpreted this story in such a way that the Woman, fleeing from the Dragon, is the Orthodox Church, fleeing from the Turkish conqueror, the Dragon, to Moscow. Accordingly, Moscow is a copy of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, and its original mission — to protect true Christianity (Shaeder, 1929, p. 8). And of no small importance in asserting such an ambitious theory was the factor of the Catholic religion as the dominant one in the camp of the main geopolitical enemies of Moscow of that period: Poland, Lithuania, and the northern knightly orders.

However, trying on the “Monomakh hat” and declaring itself the third Rome gave Moscow the right not only in its actions against neighboring powers. It was a kind of messianic claim to global domination, to oppose the real Rome and its Pope and Emperor. Moscow was assuming the Byzantine mission of fighting the schismatic Papists as well as fighting the German usurpers, Moscow openly declared that “we are the third Rome, and there is no fourth”, thereby questioning the legitimacy of the Holy Roman Empire. Gradually, the “Byzantine strategic culture” blossomed more and more in the political, spiritual, and cultural life of the Moscow Principate. It finally had taken shape under the first crowned tsar of Moscow, Ivan the Terrible. It was under his reign that the institutions of feudal democracy were strangled, church hierarchs began to obey the tsar as “God’s anointed one”, despotism and collectivism began to prevail over individualistic thinking among common people, and the idea of a messianic third Rome, the Orthodox “kingdom of heaven”, which fights against the Antichrist from the West took on the sinister framework of imperial ideology. For almost all of subsequent history, the idea of a “crusade to the West” kept dominating Russian ideology.

The USSR pursued this ideology in its way continuing anti-western politics. Meanwhile, it was resurrected almost literally by the Russian authorities at the beginning of the XXI century. Besides becoming the most comprehensive for the whole state ideology, it has penetrated all other dimensions of strategic culture, often deepening and explaining them. And, of course, the main proponent of this ideology is the Russian Orthodox Church, which has combined its efforts with the state, and gained certain results.

First, it has updated the basic idea of rivalry with the West, which almost disappeared in 1990<sup>th</sup> when Moscow and most of the NATO states became “strategic partners”. The Russian Orthodox Church tends to define the essence of Russian civilization as the one, contrasting to the West. In this regard, the military confrontation with the West is perceived as an “expression of the eternal struggle of Russian civilization with the Antichrist” (Adamsky, 2019, p. 154).

Second, it puts forward the idea of Russian exclusivity and messianic purpose. According to this kind of rhetoric, Russia is trying to defend its territories, and its values being gradually taken away by the “forces of evil”. In this regard, Moscow becomes the center of the Orthodox world, covering not only the Russian state but the lands, which can be united by the Russian language, Orthodoxy, common history, and culture. In this combination, Moscow behaves as a nucleus of such a world, not only showing the way to other nations (Russians as a God-bearer nation in Dostoyevsky interpretation) but also performing their protection. This doctrine, often described as Spiritual Staples, covers not only the so-called Russian World, automatically interpreting Ukraine and Belarus as Russian nations but also finding the opportunities to expand to the Balkans, Moldova, and even Syria. Showing the Russian messianic role the interference of Moscow in the Syrian conflict was interpreted by Patriarch Kirill as a “holy war” “to protect Christians in the Syria rebellious towns” (Adamsky, 2019, p. 186).

Third, it provides strong ideological argumentation for the other dimensions of strategic culture. In particular, the annexation of Crimea is explained as returning the heart of the Holy Rus. Here, Crimea is presented as the “cradle of the Russian faith” where Count Vladimir the Baptist of Rus, was baptized and then brought the Orthodoxy to Kyiv, “the Mother of the Russian cities” (Adamsky, 2019, p. 187). In this regard Moscow sees itself as the political and spiritual successor of the Kyiv Rus, therefore considering Ukraine a part of this Russian World while the annexation of Crimea is interpreted as a “return to being itself” and re-becoming the Third Rome.

### **Gathering of the Russian lands**

The state-forming model of Russia itself is based on the principle of the forced seizure of territory. It is about the so-called “gathering of lands”. This process began with fierce competition between the Grand Principate of Moscow and Tver for the possession of the Vladimir Volost, which was considered the spiritual, cultural, and economic center of eastern Russia (Горский, 2010, с. 117). Beginning with Grand Prince Ivan Kalita, Vladimir became on a more or less permanent basis the hereditary possession of Moscow princes, giving them formally much greater authority among other Russian regional rulers. This authority was further strengthened after the victory of the Russian combined forces in the Battle of Kulikovo Field.

However, the event, which for any European nations would have been an occasion for national consolidation and further Reconquista in no way brought real consolidation, and the subsequent expansion within the “gather-

ing of the Russian lands” the Moscow principedom carried out exclusively by force. Under Ivan, the Third, Tver, Vyatka volost, Verkhovsky principalities, Posemye, and Severskaya land were gathered by military force. Under Basil III the autonomy of Pskov and Ryazan was abolished, during the military campaign, Smolensk was joined (Хорошкевич, 1976, с. 49). As a result, in Russian historiography, this period is regarded as a period of transformation of the Grand Participate of Moscow into the Russian state. It finally has taken shape under Ivan the Terrible, who had defeated the neighboring Tatar principalities in wars, began military colonization of Siberia, and finally returned Novgorod into the orbit of Moscow influence. In the future, all of Moscow’s territorial expansion would take place exclusively by force.

The process of colonization of Ukraine had begun under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich and had ended with the Third Partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Baltic territories had been conquered as a result of the Great Northern War. Russia got access to the Black Sea and Crimea as a result of the wars with Turkey (Флоря, 2010, с. 10). We can safely conclude that territorial expansion, which became a state-forming factor for Russia is an integral part of its strategic culture, a metaphysical justification of its power and strength on the world stage. The gathering of lands, which allowed Moscow to consolidate the legacy of Kievan Rus’ around itself, became a fundamental feature of the Russian mentality: in Moscow’s mind, there is an association of territorial expansion with becoming a great state. And accordingly, the loss of territory is one of the most painful factors, almost a subconscious signal that the state has lost not even the status of great power, but some kind of self-identity.

That is why Russia has historically always been afraid of “Drang nach Osten”, the advancement of Western interests to the East. It should be recalled that the most critical moments in Russian history are associated with Western military operations against Russia.

Looking back, Moscow was invaded only once in history by Western power: the French in 1812 while the Nazis were stopped a few kilometers from the capital in 1941 (Sinovets, 2020).

But at that time Moscow was situated 1300 miles away from the Western borders while after the breakup of the Soviet Union this distance shortened up to 500 miles. It’s not surprising that Russian president Putin called the breakup of the USSR in 1991 “the greatest tragedy in history”. To a major extent, Russia’s invincibility owes to its vast strategic depth. For example, in the last two invasions (Napoleon and Hitler) the rivals’ efforts taken to approach Moscow exhausted them to the extent their advantage laid the background for their future defeat (Friedman, 2020). The lack of supply the very cold snowy winters and the vast territories all contributed to the famous idea of Clausewitz that Russia can’t be defeated from the outside. All in all, it probably explains the Russian permanent strive for retaining strategic depth and its high vulnerability for any territorial losses. In this regard, Ukraine and Georgia who officially claim to become NATO members cause high anxiety in Moscow. Despite the fact they have gained independence about three

decades ago Russia always regarded them as the buffer zone with the enlarging Alliance. The Baltic States managed to enter NATO while Russia was still too weak and unable to bolster this process with brutal force. Currently, it's becoming the major factor of Russian aggressive behavior when it comes to Ukrainian and Georgian NATO efforts. Therefore, in March 2021 referring to the words of President Zelensky about the necessity of Ukraine to join NATO, Russian MFA officially responded: "The situation of Ukraine hypothetically joining NATO is eager not only to stimulate the escalation on the South-East ... but is eager to cause irreversible consequences for the Ukrainian statehood" (Волков, 2021). As far as this statement appeared in April 2021 when the Russian 100 thousand armies concentrated near the Donbas border with Ukraine we can conclude that Russia directs strong coercive efforts on retaining Ukraine as a buffer zone. And probably it is ready to pay a price high for this. In his address to the Federal Assembly from late April 2021, Putin declared Russia drawing the red lines while those who "threaten the core interests of our security will regret what they have done in a way they have not regretted anything for a long time" (Presidential Address, 2021).

Coming back to post-Soviet history, the painful attitude to losing strategic depth is brightly reflected in Russia's resistance to the enlargement of NATO to the East. Since 2010 the enlargement of NATO was listed in the Military Doctrine "Military dangers" chapter while the "existence of Russian Federation" has been closely associated with its territorial integrity (Военная доктрина, 2010). Since 2000 Russian military doctrine defines "territorial claims to Russian Federation" as the number one military threat to Moscow (Военная доктрина, 2000), while in the Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence 2020 territorial integrity along with sovereignty of the state have become the main object of protection by nuclear deterrence (Fundamentals of Russia's, 2020). The basic reason is clear — the non-acceptance of the annexed Crimea as the part of Russia by the world community made Moscow providing special reference to the territorial integrity in the Deterrence Fundamentals, however, as we see, the territorial integrity remains the basic concern of Moscow for the last twenty years.

Also, the fact that the Russian statehood was based on using hard power also defined the attitude of the Russians towards it. For Moscow, the world of XXI is still the world of political realism where the military power of the state matters above all. It is the measure of influence. Sergey Karaganov explained it, saying that Russia was not practicing active deterrence in 1990<sup>th</sup> and as the result, the West conducted military operations against Yugoslavia and Iraq, while Russia lost its influence drastically. But in the last decade when military power became one of the major tools of the Russian security policy, Moscow brought the lost positions back, restoring its role as the "main supplier of peace" in international relations (Караганов, 2021).

The other view is closely connected with the widely circulated idea that Russia would be defeated or enslaved if losing its military and nuclear positions. The phenomenon of nuclear orthodoxy brought by Egor Holmogorov almost a decade ago is still alive as it reflects the state of mind of the Rus-

sian politician in a perfect way. The main principle of the 'Atomic Orthodoxy' idea, according to Holmogorov (2007), is that "to stay Orthodox Russia should be a strong nuclear power and to stay a nuclear power it should be Orthodox". Holmogorov takes this idea from the concept of nuclear parity, which, brings Russia and the West rivalry from the physical (war) domain into the mental and spiritual arena. Here the Orthodoxy stands on guard of values; the nuclear arsenal makes it possible, allowing Russia to avoid Western spiritual dominance. The main idea is that Russia should remain a great power, so none could impose it once own way of life.

### **The besieged fortress**

One of the most important features of Russian strategic culture is playing on the contrast between Russia and the West, presenting the latter as the "forces of evil" dreaming to destroy Russia's might and power. This tradition also has deep historical roots. In particular, the historian Kostomarov, who wrote one of the earliest comparative works on the Russian and Ukrainian political identities emphasized that the Russian identity traditionally underlined the primacy of its civilization over the "others", having the feeling of high vulnerability in the face of any enlargement of the Western civilization closer to Russian borders (Kostomarov, 1903).

This tradition was enhanced by the permanent Orthodoxy rivalry with Catholicism, however, gained certain independence during Soviet times. In particular, if the Third Rome idea rests on the messianic goals, then "the besieged fortress" was formulated later after the October revolution and the civil war when the West was blamed for most of the internal problems in Russia. Since then hating the West has become the most important mobilizing slogan for Russia as well as the tool of self-defense to avoid Soviet people going to the West and comparing the level of life with the Soviet one" (Млечин, 2013).

"So, comrades, bear in mind that the proletarians of the Soviet Union are in a besieged fortress, said Mikhail Kalinin the formal head of the USSR in 1934, — and consequently the USSR regime should follow the fortress regime" (Млечин, 2013).

The idea of the besieged fortress was also noticed by George Kennan in his famous Long Telegram and then the article "The Sources of the Soviet Conduct" which he described as the efforts of Soviet authorities "to present the outside world as hostile" pursuing the goal "to maintain dictatorial authority at home" (X, 1947, p. 571).

Today not much has changed since the Soviet times. On the opposite, having absorbed Soviet traditions of ruling the state president Putin picked up the familiar way of presenting this issue. The militarization of the discourse and the concept of the besieged fortress has become the main course for Russia, the background of national consolidation around its political regime (Концепция осажденной, 2018). One of the most obvious examples is the national mythology, which was formed regarding the Great Patriotic War narrative. The idea of the great victory of the USSR nations led by Russians over the nazis (often associated with the West, dreaming of conquering or



humiliating Fatherland) has become the central point of the Russian World concept as well. Looking at the Levada center statistics for 2020 we can notice that 76 % of Russians see Great Patriotic War as the most important event in the XX century history of Russia while for 89 % the victory in GPW is the source of the major historical pride (Общественное мнение, 2021, с. 30).

Referring to Sergey Karaganov (2021), one of the Russian main ideologists in the field of security and foreign policy: “We have enemies now and it’s for good. Unfortunately, Russia can’t function without an enemy. We tried in 1990<sup>th</sup> when we didn’t have enemies — and collapsed immediately”.

Karaganov tries to persuade that Russia is different from the West and has its unique way. Meanwhile, the West (mostly the US) is often presented by Russian authorities as a source of all evils for Russia. More and more it sounds as if the essence of Russian civilization couldn’t be crystallized without this “sacral confrontation” with the West.

The interesting issue is that in the XXI century the soft power of the West has also been labeled as a danger for Moscow. In 2014 Russian authorities started pronouncing this issue loudly. For example, Patriarch Kirill claimed that the main threat he saw from the West was presenting the Western way of life as the universal one and then imposing it on Russia. This, in Kirill’s opinion, would lead to the implosion of the state from within and, consequently, was even more dangerous than the hard power threats (Adamsky, 2019, p. 227). A similar message was brightly reflected in the Russian Military Doctrine, issued in December 2014 where the chapter on the internal military dangers appeared. The main internal military danger was described as “the informational influence over the population aimed at undermining spiritual and patriotic traditions”, actually repeating concerns of Kirill regarding the negative influence of the Western liberal values over the stability of the authoritarian political regime in Moscow (Sinovets, Renz, 2015).

### **Conclusion**

Summing up, we can suggest that the centrifugal forces are still so powerful in Russia, that the driving power of gathering lands is not enough to keep them together. Here on one hand the Russian messianic purpose and its Third Rome self-perception create an ideological background for Moscow’s foreign and security policy. On the other, the “besieged fortress” presents an additional tool for the consolidation of Russian society, however as far as it is based on dividing the society on “us vs. them” it can’t be the long-lasting tool of such consolidation.

Traditional strategic culture has become an important factor of Russian political and security identity. Having defined a range of vectors in its development it has started the main features of Moscow’s self-perception, which in its turn influence its worldview and its behavior patterns. In particular, they are: the messianism, created by the Third Rome concept; the gathering of lands principle which led to the rising of the Moscow Kingdom and turning it into the Russian Empire; and “the besieged fortress” concept, having helped Russian authorities to keep the state united in the darkest times of its history.

It is necessary to say that all of these dimensions are deeply intervened and embedded in the Orthodox religious tradition, which on one hand preserves the Russian identity, preventing it from being changed by globalization, but on the other, drives the energy for contrasting Russia to the West and setting the moral paradigm for justifying most of the imperial plans of the Russian authorities.

All of these vectors, mentioned above have set the background for the expansionist nature of the Russian state. The idea of the Third Rome gave Russia the background for the Russian World theory as well as justified the annexation of Crimea as the task inevitable to preserve the Russian spirituality. The gathering lands principle paved the way for the sacralization of the territory phenomenon for Russia which made the break-up of the Soviet Union and the enlargement of NATO to the West especially painful for Moscow. As the result, the reaction based on the attempts to restore the traditional Russian spheres of influence has been explained in Moscow as vital, just, and necessary for preserving the Russian state. Moreover, the role of the hard power in the rising of the Russian state led to the cultivation of military power in Russian security policy. It has started playing not only the role of the deterrent mechanism but also the role of the savior of the Russian way of life. And finally, the besieged fortress idea became the building element of the Russian identity and strategic culture. It claims the existence of the strong rivals as the precondition of Russia remaining a great power. Therefore the current way of breaking the international order in different ways seems to be regarded by the Russian authorities as to the most optimal one for stabilizing the state.

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## **СУТНІСТЬ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ СТРАТЕГІЧНОЇ КУЛЬТУРИ: ВІД ТРЕТЬОГО РИМУ ДО РОСІЙСЬКОГО СВІТУ**

### **Резюме**

Стаття присвячена дослідженню стратегічної культури РФ і її впливу на головні напрямки зовнішньої політики і політики в галузі безпеки Російської Федерації. Зокрема ми пропонуємо розподілити російську стратегічну культуру на три напрямки, які беруть свій початок в історичних, географічних і релігійних засадах Московського царства.

Перший напрямок — це доктрина Третього Риму, яка поклала початок російському імперському месіанізму, зробивши конфронтацію між Росією і Заходом невід'ємною рисою існування РФ, а також підготувала ґрунт для анексії Криму в 2014 році.

Другий напрямок — це так зване «збирання земель», принцип якого сформував сакральне значення ідеї стратегічної глибини і визначив незмінне прагнення Росії до розширення власної території. Як результат, розпад Радянського Союзу і розширення НАТО на схід вважається росіянами одними з найтрагічніших епізодів російської історії кінця ХХ століття, які в подальшому призвели до зростання конфронтаційної ролі РФ в міжнародній системі.

Третє — це принцип «обложеної фортеці», який ще з радянських часів активно виступає цементуючим елементом російського суспільства, оскільки передбачає що заперукою величчя Росії може бути тільки існування у неї ворогів.

**Ключові слова:** стратегічна культура, доктрина Третього Риму, ядерне православ'я, «руський мір», анексія Криму, розширення НАТО.

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**СУЩНОСТЬ РОССИЙСКОЙ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОЙ КУЛЬТУРЫ:  
ОТ ТРЕТЬЕГО РИМА К РУССКОМУ МИРУ**

**Резюме**

Статья посвящена исследованию стратегической культуры РФ и ее влиянию на главные направления внешней политики и политики в области безопасности Российской Федерации. В частности мы предлагаем распределить российскую стратегическую культуру на три направления, которые берут свое начало в исторических, географических и религиозных истоках Московского царства.

Первое направление — это доктрина Третьего Рима, которая положила начало российскому имперскому мессианизму, сделав конфронтацию между Россией и Западом неотъемлемой чертой существования РФ, а также подготовила почву для аннексии Крыма в 2014 году.

Второе направление — это так называемое «собрание земель», принцип которого сформировал сакральное значение идеи стратегической глубины и определил неизменное стремление России к расширению собственной территории. Как результат, распад Советского Союза и расширение НАТО на восток считается россиянами одними из самых трагичных эпизодов российской истории конца XX века, которые в дальнейшем привели к росту конфронтационной роли РФ в международной системе.

Третье — это принцип «осажденной крепости», который еще с советских времен активно выступает цементирующим элементом российского общества, поскольку предполагает, что залогом величия России может быть только существование у нее врагов.

**Ключевые слова:** стратегическая культура, доктрина Третьего Рима, ядерное православие, «русский мир», аннексия Крыма, расширение НАТО.