

УДК 321.01:327.8

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DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.18524/2304-1439.2020.33.208986>

**THEORIES OF WORLD ORDER TRANSITION AND THE CURRENT  
PHASE OF WORLD POLITICS**

The present article first reviews three schools of research on order transition in the world political system, namely the hegemony theory school, the power transition theory school, and the interconnected region orders argument of the region studies school. Second, the article selects the hegemony theory as the one better suited to grasping the complexity of the current movement from the de-legitimised American hegemonic order to the future unknown one. The analysis traces the progress of the contemporary world order and politics from the Second World War to the present time edging on moving towards the new world order. The concluding remarks spot notable issues of the study of the incoming order transition.

**Key words:** Hegemony, Power, Order, Transition, Regions.

Research on order transition in world politics is blooming again. What comes next to the decline of the United States power and to the unidentified rising power of China, what comes next to the loosening ties of the existing alliances and coalitions, what comes next to the crisis of the world policies towards trade and finance, are questions filling the present research of the IR scientists. They address the study of order transition by applying either holism or individualism ontology. According to the former, what matters to understanding transition from the extant order to the future one is knowledge about the structure and process of the world political system and about inputs from the outside economic, technological, geo-physical, and cultural environment. Opposite to the scientists of the holistic or systemic perspective, the scientist of the individualism or agent perspective build knowledge about order transition by analysing states one at time and by fitting together the data of the aims, resources and capabilities of the surveyed states.

The present article develops knowledge about world order transition both as an issue of the IR discipline and as the object of a theory-based empirical research that is aimed to grasp the understanding of the movement from the decaying American order to the future unknown one. First the article reviews three schools of research on world order transition and highlights their principal commonalities and differences on the base of their ontology perspective.

The schools are the long-time established hegemony theory and power transition theory, and the recent-shaped argument of the interconnected regional orders that is set in the region studies school.

The hegemony theory occupies the holism field. The power transition theory, initially a genuine individualist theory, is leaning towards integrating individualism into the systemic perspective. The interconnected regional orders theory occupies the individualistic field. To say the truth, in the three schools, great powers matter in building and changing order. But the difference remains. The hegemony theory puts the great power at the centre of a web of systemic interactions that curbs its role and progressively puts an end to the hegemonic order. Therefore, the hegemony theory is truly holistic theory. The power transition theory has moved from the individualistic approach of its origins in the family of the realist theories to accounting for the influence of systemic constraints on the relationship between the dominant power and its challenger. Since such relationship is the clue of the order transition, this theory is positioned between the two ontology approaches. The interconnected regional orders theory, instead, gives to the great powers of the regions the role of addressing order at both the region and world level. In particular, the scientists of this school theorize the exit from the present disorder as the first case of building a multipolar world order cooked up by regional powers. Therefore, such school is typically bended to the actor-oriented ontology.

Such classification does not pretend to be perfect but, like all classifications and generalisations of social and political science theories, is useful to mark similarities and differences and to ease research advancement through theory dialogue. In such a perspective, the present chapter makes a case for the holistic ontology perspective. In particular, it exhibits the advantages of using the hegemony theory for building knowledge about world order transition as an issue and as well for grasping the complexity of the study about the present days' movement from the de-legitimised American hegemonic order to the unknown future one.

The chapter is organised as it follows. The first section presents concepts for researching on world order transition. The second section compares the three theories of order transition. The third section traces the progress of the contemporary world order and politics from the Second World War to the present time edging on transition to the new world order. The fourth section and the concluding remarks spot some notable issues of the study of the incoming order transition.

### **The conceptual scheme**

According to holistic researchers, summing together the analyses of the foreign policy of individual states does not help the scientist to understanding the world politics process. Holistic researchers share the view of the structuration school (Giddens, 1984; Wendt, 1987) that perceives the system and actors as mutually constitutive and determinative entities. The system organization determines the nature and actions of the states while the interaction between the states to respond to collective problems changes the organiza-

tion of the system. Accordingly, political scientists have to analyse the world through holistic lenses because (1) the whole world is the space of collective problems, and (2) the policy response to such problems is made by the states that interact within, and as well modify, the structure of the world political system.

To elucidate such aspects, I suggest distinguishing three kind of problems of the states: the individual, common and collective problems. The *individual* problems are problems that hit the single state. The state responds to such problems on its own and how it wishes. These problems are not in the agenda of the world political system, and normally they are not the objects of the analysis of IR scientists. The *common* problems hit simultaneously a number of states, and are managed and solved either by each state on its own or by the group of the states that decide to respond by coordinated or common actions. The affected states may decide also to act for politicising the common problem, i.e. to turn it into a problem of the world political agenda to respond to by rules binding all the world system members. Last, the *collective* problems hit the whole system or possibly a large number of states and are effectively put under control and possibly solved only where all the states abide by rules or policies authoritatively issued to such purpose. It follows that the units (persons or states) that are affected by a collective problem are *de facto* the members of a political space, i.e. are within a space in which the effective response to the collective problem depends on making and implementing the authoritative decision pointing to respond to the problem and binding all of them. In conclusion, a collective problem creates a political space. On its turn, the political space needs a political system to build binding decisions and policies towards that problem.

In the early decades of the past century, European social scientists and policy-makers started to debate about dealing with problems affecting large groups of states and even the whole world (Rosenboim, 2019). Later, at the end of World War II, the victorious states acknowledged to be the members of the worldwide political space. Indeed, they decided to establish world policy-making institutions to respond to worldwide collective problems. They established the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) that in 1995 turn into the World Trade Organisations (WTO) because they recognised as chief collective problems the security of the sovereign state from armed aggression, the effects of financial uncertainty on the wealth of the states, and the damages of escalating trade wars on international and domestic stability.

In the following decades, the debate about interdependence and globalisation raised the issue of addressing new worldwide problems and making new public policies in addition to those agreed on at the end of the world war. The 1971 Stockholm UN conference on the environment is the best example of such turning point in world politics. In reality, addressing new collective problems was, and continues to be today, a matter of choosing between two opposite responding strategies: (1) the strategy preserving the state as the

*unlimited* political system that is legitimated by its citizens to make own policies towards any problem, possibly coordinating with other states and international organisations on *ad hoc* basis; or (2) the strategy incorporating the state in the policy-making, possibly worldwide, system that fits to the need of respond to collective problems.

The number of collective problems that have effects on a space larger than the largest state on earth is high and growing today. In the last centuries, the states passed from sharing very few collective problems — such as the problem of enforcing the same rights of territorial sovereignty and security, the problem of trading goods in safe conditions, the problem of currency circulation in predictable conditions, and the problem of the free and safe crossing of the seas and oceans — to a rather large number of collective problems such as, to name a few, stopping air pollution and climate warming up, controlling migration and mass movement, containing epidemics and big diseases, fighting trans border organized crime, and ruling the cyberspace.

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the state governments used to negotiate bilateral agreements and ad-hoc arrangements to overcome the damage of common problems. Later, groups of states institutionalised their response to common and collective problems by establishing international organisations (IOs) and enacting the solutions that the IO experts proposed and the state representatives approved. In other terms, gradually the states recognized they are the members of inclusive political spaces, and that complying with decisions binding them is good to efficaciously coping with collective problems.

In general terms, the political space is the space where equal, free, rational units solve the collective problems by binding themselves to policies that are made by legitimate institutions on the basis of agreed values and principles of order. In IR terms, the states that acknowledge being the members of the world political space constitute the world political system. They take in such system their fundamental features, i.e. sovereignty, rationality, and morphological homogeneity. As sovereign units, the states interact with the world political system while they are free to opt for their own goals and make consequent actions. As rational units, they routinely make decisions of action according to a fixed scale of preference and utility. Last, the states are equal by morphology, all of them have territory, population, and a legal system, but they are *de facto* different from one another since the territory differs for aspects like size, resources, and fertility; the population differ for aspects like size, culture, and cohesion; the legal system differs for aspects like sensitivity, firmness, and resilience. All these features matter to the involvement and role of the individual state in the world political system and as well to the strength of the values and principles of the world political order that underpins the legitimacy of the policy-making institutions and of the policies towards the collective problems. The impact of such aspects will be further explored in the next sections of this article.

In all human societies, order is the necessary condition for reducing the uncertainty and insecurity of the members. For the sake of living in safe and predictable conditions, the individuals are ready to give a portion of

their freedom of decision and action to the society they are part of, and to submit themselves to the laws and policies that take order to the society. In the present discourse about the world political system, 'political order' is the set of values and principles that bound the world policy-making institutions. Who brings out the values and principles of the world political order and sets up the institutions of the world political system? The simple answer is 'the great powers do'. The rulers of these states share perceptions and preferences towards the values and the institutions making the policies for solving collective problems. Additionally, they have the power resources to gain the engagement of other states on their preferred values and policies that make and change the world order. If they do not share preferences towards institutions and policies, order is fragile, and transition to a new order is near to come.

### **The theories on order transition**

The great power role is the core of realism in mainstream IR. The power transition, the world hegemony, and the interconnected regions order theory owe something to the mainstream IR theory. They draw as well on new concepts and arguments because they want to decipher the contemporary world system change. In the present section, the three theories are presented and compared to each other addressing their potentials to enlighten the order transition issue.

#### *Hegemonic order theory*

To realists, military and economic power gives to great powers dominance on the international system. Therefore, the number of great powers matters to classifying the system. Realists call the system as unipolar, bipolar or multipolar system meaning that one, two or more than two great powers dominate the system. The bipolar and multipolar systems persist in time as long as the military and economic resources of the great powers are in equilibrium, the balance of power. Accordingly, to realists, order is the state of affairs imposed by the dominant state(s); order transition is the replacement of the dominant state(s) by the new great power(s) that impose its dominant status. The hegemony theorists, instead, explains the authority of one country by the systemic conditions that generate the hegemony relationship. The scientists of the hegemony theory value as well the change of the system conditions as the cause of hegemony transition. Such conditions comprise (a) the multidimensional, namely political, economic, military, and cultural, capability of one state, the hegemon, willing to provide public goods that are needed and valued by many states; (b) the special relationship between the hegemon and many states that compose the dominant or hegemonic coalition; and (c) the actual supply of public goods by the hegemon and its closest allies, i.e. the core members of the dominant coalition. In contemporary hegemony, public goods are mostly provided through the operation of world policy-making institutions that are backed by the hegemon. Last, the world hegemonic order is inherently exposed to change and goes through a life cycle that develops through instauration, decline, and transition to the new hegemony.

The genealogy of the hegemony theory in international studies includes the work of the German historian Ludwig Dehio (1948/1988), the use of the Gramsci's concept of «political and moral direction» (Gramsci, 1971) by IR students (Augelli and Murphy, 1988) and the introduction of the hegemonic stability theory in international studies by the economic historian Charles Kindleberger (1981). He highlighted the function of public goods like security and economic growth that are provided by the hegemon country and that stimulate the compliance of the other states with the order preferred by the hegemon.

To political scientists (Gilpin, 1981; Modelski, 1983, 1999; Ikenberry, 2001), the hegemon state is the state able to put together the coalition that overpowers all other coalitions that could be involved in world political competition and violent confrontation as well. In the hegemonic order discourse, a coalition of states is the group of states that have close interest in keeping or reforming the world order; some of them share also key traits of culture. Because of shared interests and possibly culture, they cooperate durably in world affairs by formal ties or informal partnership. In other terms, the hegemonic coalition is a network of countries and as well of official alliances and informal groups of countries. The hegemonic state is the hub of such network because it has the control of the leading sectors of the world economy and of advanced military and diplomatic capabilities, and as well the will to sustain the cost of providing public goods to the world and the will to extend hegemony over time. In particular, the hegemon state has the command of long-range communication and world transportation routes, is in control of the world trade of strategic goods and advanced products, and issues the most used currency in international trade and state reserve assets. Last, the hegemonic country and the dominant coalition rule on the world political system while local great powers can organise international relations at the region level within the boundary conditions established by the hegemon and its coalition.

Once instituted, the political order is not a static and uncontested object. It undergoes change and inevitably turns into an object of confrontation. This is the effect of two related process. First, the constant transformation of the social, technological, and ideological environment of the world political system overcomes the policy response capability of the hegemon, its coalition, and world institutions. Second, new collective problems arise; the policies towards the existing problems turn into obsolescent ones; new items populate the world agenda; and new preferences of the states towards the world order come into being. The states rich in resources and capabilities and as well less favoured by the existing policies point to amending and subverting the active order. Initially, they oppose the policies and policy-making institutions and de-legitimise the hegemonic order. Later, they create the revisionist coalition that has the potential to start transition to the new order.

The hegemony school scientists agree that the hegemonic order, after a phase of growth and a phase of decline, is seriously assailed by enemies and revisionist states and has an end. In other terms, hegemonies undergo a process that looks like a life cycle. To some, such as Gilpin and Modelski, a new

hegemony replaces the previous one. The hegemon could be the same state that led the previous hegemonic order but the new order has new policy-making institutions and the world policies are based on new values and interests. To others, such as Cox and Ikenberry, disorder comes after the end of a hegemony, and a different kind of international system replaces the ruined hegemonic order.

Modelski's analysis of the past five centuries of world hegemonies is centred upon the life-cycle regularity. It distinguishes the implementation, de-legitimation, coalition reconfiguration, and macro-decision phase. In the implementation phase the dominant coalition build the institutions and carries out the policies of the new order project. In the de-legitimation phase, the world institutions and policies do not respond to the expectance and wishes of states that express dissatisfaction and request of changing the existing order. In the coalition reconfiguration phase, the dissatisfied states propose a new order project. The most powerful of these states push for building the revisionist coalition and for contrasting the decadent hegemonic coalition. In the macro-decision phase, the declining coalition and the coalition of all opposing states confront each other by hostile moves and actions.

The hegemony school claims that hegemonic orders end by the conflict between the status quo states that want to maintain the existing order, and the revisionist states that want to replace it with an order installing new principles and institutions. From the study of past world hegemonies, the analysts draw the conclusion that such conflict is waged through long and extensive violence, namely through the world war that accomplishes order transition. Robert Gilpin (1981; 1988) demonstrated that, since the 17th century, two state coalitions went three times to general war, namely the Thirty Years' War, 1619-1648; the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte, 1792-1815; and the First and Second World War, 1914-1945. Modelski and Morgan (1985) and Thompson (1988) made the analysis of hegemony on a longer period of time and demonstrated that order change followed world war five times in the past five centuries, namely the Italian and the Indian Ocean Wars, 1490s-1510s; the Dutch Independence War, 1580s-1600s; the Louis XIV Wars, 1680s-1710s; the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790s-1810s; and the World Wars I and II, 1910s-1940s.

Knowledge about the past seventy years of world politics discloses the progress of institutional mechanisms and intergovernmental methods of peaceful management of world contentious issues. The plurality of the groups of debate and coordination among state governments such as the G7 and G20 meetings of the heads of government and ministers and the numerous UN conferences are illustration of such transformation. They add to the increased frequency of bilateral meetings and direct talks of state leaders. Taking into account such feature of the world system, one might argue that the next order transition will be a progressive and gradual change with no recourse to all-out war. The issue of whether the next phase of world politics will be a time of large violence and war or the unprecedented non-violent reform of the world order is further discussed in the last sections of the present article.

*Power transition theory*

Organski (1958), a leading scientist of political development and world politics, conceived the power transition theory in the late 1950s. The key theme of his studies was the impact of the differential growth rates of the great powers on the world political system, and particularly the impact of the differential growth of the most powerful country, named the dominant power, and of the second most powerful one, the challenger.

Since the first edition of the Organski's book, a growing number of authors have been addressing various aspects of the relationship between the rising-power and the most powerful, dominant state. In a recent essay, Tammen, Kugler, and Lemke (2018) make an excellent review of the research topics and findings of the scholars that engaged in the Organski-inspired research programme that has been named power transition theory.

The states differ from one another in resources, people, socio-political features and as well, consequently, in their political weight on world affairs. The studies of the power transition theorists spotlight the possible courses of action and the risk of war that arise at the time the challenger approaches to and overcomes the power of the dominant state. The studies created a rich and consistent body of knowledge about the key aspects of this theme such as the resources of power, the foreign policy of the dominant and the challenger state, the peaceful or violent form of their conflict relations, and the effects of their relationship on the state of the world system and on selected international regions.

All such topics of interest to the power transition theory are topics of interest also to the hegemony theory. The two theories have much in common. To both of them, for example, the key concept of power represents the ability of one state to advance its own goals and interests by influencing or altering the policies of the other states. But differences between the two theories are not minor at all. Both hegemony and dominance are founded on the inequality of power, but the states in charge of the top political role in the world make use of power in very different ways, mainly to raise consensus in the hegemonic order, mainly to raise obedience in the dominance order.

The hegemon state establishes its position by sharing values and interests with a large coalition of states. Although value and interest sharing by all the members of the hegemonic coalition is not strong and stable, the strategy of the hegemonic state to address the major problems of the world order is founded on a set of values and principles consistent with the interests of the coalition members. In particular, the hegemon is expected to provide public goods to accomplish the policies relevant to the values and interests of the coalition members. By providing public goods, the hegemon reinforces consensus to its position. This is true in the early phase of the hegemony but the constant change of the system and the opposition of the states that do not benefit from the hegemonic order make increasingly difficult to exercise the hegemonic power. The declining efficaciousness of the policies supplying public goods and the diminishing capability of the institutions to update the



policies give place to the de-legitimation of the hegemonic order and the approaching of order transition.

In the world represented by the power transition theory, instead, the dominant state establishes and steers the world order thanks to overwhelming power resources, and for the sake of keeping with its own interests and the interests of the small group of the allied countries. Though the role of the dominant state does not lie on sharing with other states the value and interest foundations of the world order, the satisfaction of the allied states is important to the stability of the dominance system. In particular, the dominant state care about having good relations and establishing alliance pacts with the great powers, i.e. with the states in the second layer of the world hierarchy of power. Such relations are essential to keep world order working by peaceful means. The dominant state prioritises the policies benefitting the interest of the great powers, increasing their satisfaction with the existing order, creating a group of loyal supporters, and moving away the risk of power confrontation.

Symmetrical to the prominence of the alliance relationship between the dominant state and the great powers is the almost insignificant function of the world policy-making institutions and international organisations of keeping on the dominance system. In the power transition theory, world order is the outcome of the paramount supremacy of power resources of the dominant state and its correlate political capabilities to address world problems and drive international relations by its own. Accordingly, the theory underrates the relevance of the world institutions and organisations as essential means of action of the dominant state. In the hegemonic order theory, instead, the world policy-making institutions are either the stage for negotiating and making consensual policies that strengthen order and stability, or the arena of the confrontation over the legitimacy of the political role of the hegemonic state and its coalition. In other terms, they have the important function of coagulating partnership supporting either the status quo or the revision of the world order.

Briefly, the power transition scholars explain the world system dynamics by the emergence of the dissatisfaction of the rising-power state and the consequent choice of such state on how to address the relation with the dominant state, including the decision to go to war. In the hegemonic order theory, instead, the dynamics of the world system depends mostly on the structural features of the system. The role of the hegemonic country partially depends on its power resources and capabilities, and mostly on the system structural, non-tangible features, namely on the existing affinity of values and accordance of interest that sustain the relationship between the hegemon and the allied countries. Accordingly, the student of world order is very much concerned with the empirical analysis of the conditions that strengthen such relationship as well as the conditions that weakens it. Such object of analysis is of interest also to the scientists of the power transition theory. In fact, those conditions are essential to build the revisionist coalition of countries that, after de-legitimising the existing order, claim the new order project.

*Interconnected regional orders argument*

The spatial discontinuity of world politics is one of the themes at the core of mainstream IR studies. The relevance of regions, regional discontinuities, and regional orders has been signalled in the 1960s and has been revisited later by many scholars (Cantori and Spiegel, 1970; Buzan and Waever, 2003; Katzenstein, 2005). Mario Telò (2013; 2016) and his associates have argued for the accomplishment of the region ascendance. The multipolar world is coming soon after the decline of the American power, they maintain, because of the emergent interconnection of the existing regional orders. Such orders are in an advanced experimental stage thanks to the assertive action of regional-power states like China, Russia, India, Turkey, Iran, South Africa, Nigeria, not to speak of the European regional order experiment that is advanced by Germany and France, and of the US-led America region order. Regional orders are supplementing the present world order vacuum and will fix the bugs that the existing world policy-making institutions are unable to repair because of the vanishing leadership of the United States and the Western coalition. The core of the argument is that the regional orders are interconnected by the norms and regimes that international organisations diffuse all over the globe. Consequently, since the regions share norms and regimes, and make rules and policies that are to a large extent complementary and compatible to one another, they will not fragment the international networks of today's world politics.

The current regional drive of international relations is an aspect of the weakening American hegemonic order but the thesis of the emergence of the multipolar world grounded in interconnected regional orders is not soundly based. Indeed, the regional-power states are conditioned by regional ties and duties and are attached to managing regional issues and problems in line with local values and interests. Consequently, they do not commit to world values and will hardly make policies fully consistent with the imperative of responding to world political, economic, and cultural problems.

Long-range history studies demonstrate that all the separated international systems that existed in pre-modern ages and had their own political order have merged into the world system in the modern age (Buzan and Little, 2000; Wallerstein, 1974; Watson, 1992). From the fifteenth century, the world system developed a unique political order. Many social scientists claim that the rise of the world order is coterminous with the advent of the world capitalist market in the late fifteenth century. At that time, the European international system pushed the confluence of all the international systems into the unique world system (Dark, 1998; McNeill, 1963). Scholars demonstrate also that the confluence is the outcome of the co-evolutionary process of the economic, technological, social, and political sectors (Frank, 1998; Frank and Gills, 1993; Modelski, Devezas, and Thompson, 2008). This process fuelled the globalization process, and created the present world system that develops along a unique evolutionary trend.

In conclusion, the interconnected regions thesis is not supported by the empirical knowledge developed by historians and social scientists. There is,

instead, strong scientific knowledge about the long-range, multi-sector process that in the past five centuries has formed the unique order of the world political system that today encapsulates the international politics of all the geographic groups of states, the regions. Furthermore, the thesis of the multipolar world of the interconnected regional orders does not provide empirical evidence supporting the assertion that the regional-power states are able to amalgamate their allegiance to the regional values and set up a unique world order.

### **The progression of the American hegemony**

The present section examines the key features of the world order of the past 70 years by employing the concepts of the hegemony theory and as well the analytical tools shared by the hegemony and power transition theory about the relationship of the leading state and the challenger state. The analysis borrows from the Modelski's model the time phases of the American hegemony. The aim is to build knowledge useful to understand the current order transition, which is in progress since it extends over the coalition reconfiguration and macro-decision phase, and knowledge useful as well to foresee the nature of the confrontation between the two coalition over the next world order.

#### *Hegemony implementation (till the early 1970s)*

The Western coalition governments considered the unrestrained use of the armed force and the uncontrolled economic and trade competition among the states as collective problems to respond to in order to enhance the stability of the world. Accordingly, in the waning of the Second World War, they decided to create world institutions to respond to those collective problems. The world institutions had the mission to support all the sovereign states at risk in the event of aggression. To advance the growth of the national and world economies, the institutions had to spread everywhere the principles of free market, free trade, and capitalism. They had also to provide financial means to increase investments and avoid imbalances. Such objectives were consistent with the values and principles the WWII victorious coalition had agreed on in various conferences and talks. They were consistent, for example, with the values of democracy, of the integrity of state sovereignty, and of the primacy of law and of human rights, and as well with the principles of national self-determination, international cooperation, and mutual solidarity. Such values and principles are expressed by documents such as the 1941 Atlantic Declaration, the Yalta Conference Agreement, and the Article 1 of the UN Charter.

To build sovereign, national, democratic, and safe states in all the areas of the world required to create and approve two policies, the policy towards ending the colonial rule, and the policy towards impeding aggression and strengthening the security of the single state and the whole world system as well. The former policy was accomplished in quite a short time by enforcing the self-determination principle. But, in many instances it was an exterior accomplishment. Implementation of the de-colonization policy had many disappointing outcomes. Especially in Africa, the new states met with political disorder and economic inefficiency. The latter policy, instead, achieved good

results by giving security to the states through the UN multilateral security system and the peacekeeping operation mechanism. Such mechanism proved to be good at providing the public good of security to all the states since the permanent members of the UN Security Council made the UN the security provider of last resort anytime the assaulted state was unable to survive to the armed aggression of another state (Attina, 2011: 215-219).

Strengthening economic stability and steering economic growth, the other policy objective of the American hegemony, was the remit of a few institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), later changed into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). These institutions had to create and implement policies towards currency exchange, capital circulation, and free trade, the core matters of the world economy. The mission of the two Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and WB, was to protect currency exchange stability, provide liquidity to facilitate trade and investment, and respond to the financial imbalances threatening the world economy. The GATT mission was to build free trade by negotiating world agreements for the reduction of tariffs and for the advancement of free trade mechanisms.

The Soviet Union leaders decided to separate their country from the world war alliance. The Western world order project was irreconcilable with the form of state, the economy, and the world organisation the Moscow regime wanted to forward at home and spread to the rest of the world. This gave origin to the Cold War. The East-West divide and confrontation did not alter the building and trajectory of the American hegemony, and did not affect very much the policy-making of the world institutions. It possibly had some strengthening effect on the American coalition and the United States' hegemonic role. Indeed, in the early times, the Cold War gave to the American hegemony a *sense of purpose* and a *unifying rationale* (Beeson and Watson, 2019: 394).

Briefly, in the twenty years after WW II, the countries of the American coalition took the leadership of the institutions that made and implemented the main world security and economic policies. They proposed and advocated the drafting and approval of international treaties and conventions, and provided ideational, financial, organisational, and human resources to the new institutions that acted consistently with the values and interests of the coalition.

*Hegemony de-legitimation (from early 1970s to early 2000s)*

In the late 1960s, turbulence hit the financial markets with consequences both on the developed economy of the wealthy countries and the stagnant economy of the new states. Economic problems had negative impact on international relations. The Western coalition countries blamed the economic policies of the United States for destabilizing the world markets and damaging the European industries with the unbalanced flows of trade between the two sides of the Atlantic. The military pacts that in the 1950s the United States had built all over the world to respond to the risk of the spreading influence of the Soviet Union vanished because of the domestic, sometimes violent, change of the political regime of many Middle East and Asia-Pacific

countries. The West European governments raised their concern to the American ally. The members of the European Community decided to harmonize the national foreign policies to mark their dissonance from the American foreign policy. In 1973, they approved the «Declaration on European Identity» claiming that the guiding principle of their foreign policy was not the Atlantic identity, but the European one.

The protest against the world policies benefiting the Western countries strengthened the Non-Aligned Countries Movement while the Group of the Seventy-seven mobilised the governments of the stagnant-economy countries against the unfair free trade policy and the lack of economic take-off prospects. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, external interference in the domestic affairs, especially in the economy, turned sovereignty into a superficial attribute. In many instances, the local rulers were deprived of the authority and of the means they needed to build the post-colonial state on solid foundations, or they proved to be unable to face the tremendous problems of driving the multi-ethnic state that was the legacy of the colonialist powers. In almost all the new countries, economic development problems, external interference, and the inexperience of the policy-makers in running the domestic political institutions, which had been designed after the European model, caused the fall of the nascent democracy and the rise of various forms of autocratic and dictatorial regime (Lee and Paine, 2019).

The United States and the Western allies intervened directly and through the United Nations peacekeeping mechanism to limit violence in international and civil conflicts that in growing number erupted especially in Africa. On the whole, the UN peacekeeping missions achieved the objective of limiting violence and taking back stability to the area of conflict. But Non-UN peace operations started to grow in number. Regional organisations and groups of like-minded states organised such operations that were more the outcome of rising unilateralism in peace security (Attina, 2014) than a case of peacekeeping regionalisation, a phenomenon considered by the experts consonant with the UN Charter (Bellamy and Williams, 2005). Moreover, the Western countries have been reducing their participation in the UN operations while the large Asian countries, China included, have increasingly provided the military staff of the UN peace operations.

In the economic matters, the Western governments were unable to avoid the 1971 breakdown of the Bretton-Woods monetary policy and to fix the damage of the consequent financial crisis. The end of the Bretton Woods monetary regime signals the emergent gap between the preference of the United States and the closest allies and the preference of the rest of the world on how to solve problems by means of world public policies. The multilateral trade policy faced increasing resistance to approving GATT accords on agricultural and strategic products. Regional blocs and unilateral agreements went on stage as the preferred means for regulating international trade relations. The domestic economic policy of the American presidents continued to burden the economies of foreign countries contributing to the declining legitimacy of the world economic order.

In conclusion, the de-legitimation of the American hegemony has been the outcome of the tremendous political and economic transformation of the world and as well of the inadequacy of the world institutions, which were influenced by the U.S. foreign policy, to respond to with appropriate policies.

*Coalition reconfiguration (from mid 2000s)*

The shift to coalition reconfiguration has been prepared by developments like the demise of groups like the Soviet bloc and the withering of others like the Non-Alignment Movement, and by the rising flexibility of the foreign policy of important countries, in particular China and Russia, though diplomatic repositioning took place all around the world. The failure of the world policies designed to respond to the traditional collective problems and as well the imperative to create policies towards the new collective problems required the upgrading of the world agenda. The G20 meetings were instituted. China joined the UN, IMF, and WTO. Russia accessed the WTO.

The coalition reconfiguration process, however, has been slow and unclear till the present time. In spite of the flexibility of the foreign policy of many countries, it is apparent that the game is in the plans of the major states. Such plans are still largely undecipherable.

The gap separating United States from the European allies is widening but the US is not firmly moving towards creating vital coalition ties with non-European countries of equal importance. Russia strives to build a front of like-minded countries sharing political goals but is unable to turn the small group of new partners into a vital coalition. Most of the Russia's friends are states of the near abroad though the Moscow leaders look for special relations with Central Asia, Africa, and the MENA countries. China's skill to de-legitimize the United States has been widening thanks to the response of a number of governments of Africa, Central and Southeast Asia to the offer of investment capital at no political conditions. Yet, China does not pursue a decisive coalition-building policy to challenge the existing world order.

In the past centuries, powerful countries formed coalitions of interest and culture for the sake of building stable and predictable relations with essential countries. These groups of countries drew order to the world by sharing policies towards solving a small number of problems such as trade, the circulation of the ocean routes, and, since the Westphalia Treaty, the rights of the sovereign king on its own state. The question of today is whether new coalitions of culture and interest are in the making to promote either the reform or the replacing of the present order and policies. In other terms, whether revisionism of the collective problem agenda and the reconfiguration of coalition ties are moving the world towards order transition. In world politics, the revisionist state criticizes the existing policies, breaches the decisions of the world policy-making institutions, and wants to alter the world system policies, rules and institutions to take its own values to the rank of world values and to address world politics to enhance its own interests. The more the revisionist government is determined to go on with the strategy of changing the world order, the more it strives for organising the coalition of the countries disposed to fight against the existing hegemony. The status quo state, instead,

abides by the policies in operation, strives for preserving the existing world institutions, and wants to maintain alive its world coalition.

Attention is drawn to the revisionism and coalition potential of the main states of the current world politics. Does the United States, or China, or Russia have the will, resources and qualities to close the life cycle of the present order and become the leader of the coalition promoting the next world order?

The United States has been able to build a tremendous coalition of interest, and in some cases of culture, with key countries of all the geographical areas. The coalition has addressed political, security, and economic matters. It consists of groups having different degrees of cohesion. The cohesion of the European group was high in the early time of the hegemony and has been decreasing later. The cohesion of the Latin American group has been high but suffered the opposition of some governments. The cohesion of the remaining groups has been generally low and volatile. Today, the overall cohesion of the American coalition is lower than in the past. The United States and the core members — i.e. the European countries, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand — never rejected the principles and rules of the post-war international order and continue to commit to democracy, open society, economic liberalism, and free trade. On the whole, they reject revisionism and put their large resources to support the status quo. Yet, they are shaken by economic and political problems, and tend to stress cultural distance from other coalition groups and to underrate the sharing of economic and trade interest. Briefly, should the core countries of the Western coalition have to respond to the challenge of confrontation with a revisionist coalition, they would find it difficult to agree on the new project of world order to contrast the antagonist coalition.

Except for the core countries, the coalition members and the United States share interest rather than culture. The American Presidents have to count on all their coalition power resources to convince the government and ruling class of these countries to abide to the policies promoted by the coalition.

Doubts about the reconfiguration of the Western coalition are rooted in the hesitation of the US Presidents about choosing between the straight defence of the status quo and going towards focused revisionism. Multilateral trade policy-making looks unfair to the American government. Bilateral and minilateral agreements based on cost-benefit terms are preferred today. This is detrimental to the WTO multilateralism but in line with the choice made by a number of countries. American Presidents supported free trade in the 1950s and 1960s because they had confidence in the competitive ascendancy of the USA industry (Stokes, 2018: 141). Something similar is passing in the currency and finance sector. In the early 1970s, the American rejection of the gold-linked monetary policy was the start of the U.S. retreat from the so-called liberal internationalism. This was repeated in the 1980s by the President Reagan's decisions that inspired the Washington Consensus policy of the Bretton Woods institutions.

Focused revisionism addresses the goal of transiting to the second American hegemony. The United States counts on huge economic and military power. The dollar continues to be the strongest reserve currency of the world. The

American companies dominate foreign direct investment. The US industry is the leader of key sectors such as biotechnology and nanotechnology. The American army is much ahead of the China's and Russia's army. The network of the United States foreign military bases is unparalleled and appreciated by coalition and freeriding countries that fear to be menaced by countries that are foes of the United States. In addition, the United States can count on the record of supporting the peace operations that provided security to states assaulted to death such as Kuwait in 1990 under the United Nations umbrella, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 under the umbrella of NATO (Yuen, 2013).

Briefly, the American coalition-rallying capability has been decreasing, but the renewal of the American hegemony cannot be dropped. Transition to the second one is possible by drawing a project attracting the countries opposing China and Russia. Another option, supported by some experts, is co-opting China in a sort of co-leadership and negotiating with Russia on the event of bilateral crises. Such option is discussed in the next section.

Communist China shared the demand of the non-aligned and developing countries to build multipolarism and give to all the states equal voice in the world policy-making institutions. But, in the late 1980s, after Mao's death, the Chinese leaders adjusted foreign policy to the policies of the world institutions to gain the most from acting peacefully within the current world order (Kastner and Saunders, 2012; Weissman, 2015). China is the second-largest contributor to the UN, the third to the WTO, and it has raised the IMF capital level and, consequently, its voting weight. This does not imply that China rules out any revisionist options.

China looks for close relations with states willing to reshape the world order. Generally, these states advocate for rigorously complying with the Westphalia principle of no interference in the internal and foreign affairs of any independent country. Principles such as forcible humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect are ominous to the Chinese leaders (Johnston, 2003) as well as to the leaders of likeminded, non-Western countries. They claim that liberal values and policies constrain state sovereignty. China's revisionism and coalition power are boosted by the admiration of Non-Western, developing countries for the ability to accomplish programmes improving the living standards short of limiting conditions such as the respect for democracy and the rule of law.

China's search for the status of state on the forefront of the world government begins in the Asia-Pacific region. China is the major driver of trade of the region. In the finance sector, China has promoted the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The second reserve of China's coalition power is Africa. For the last ten years, China has been the Sub-Saharan Africa's top export and import market (Hodzi, 2018: 5) contrasting the long-established presence of the Western countries in the continent and as well the EU's Africa policy (Hooijmaaijers, 2018). Last, China's involvement in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa has been growing steadily and China's contribution to conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction is likely to grow in the coming years since the African rulers



appreciate the Chinese approach because it is free from political conditions like institution building, legality construction, and democratic election.

The China's coalition power is expected to grow following the Belt and Road Initiative, BRI. Since promoting trade, economic development, and transport links is the fertilizer of political relations, BRI can be the tremendous instrument of the Chinese coalition power. But China has not yet solved the dilemma whether it is better building the coalition of revisionist countries to confront the United States and break down the existing world institutions and policies or keeping on with the present order that foster China's economic and political growth.

The Russian leader, Vladimir Putin strives to keep Russia in the group of the states such as India, China, and Iran that claim to organize the world by multipolar governance and oppose the world role and status of the Western coalition. His primary objective is troubling the Western coalition by interfering with the NATO alliance strategy and by weakening the European Union as economic and political bloc. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and, later, the invasion of the Ukrainian eastern provinces took the challenge to European neighbours to the highest level of security threat.

Projecting Russian power towards the Middle East and building partnerships with countries of Africa and Central Asia are the remaining goals of Putin's assertive policy. Intervention in Syria is the best example of such policy. Also, cooperation with Iran shows the Putin's assertive goal of weakening the United States stance in the area. Moscow has been active also in building security and economic networks in Central Asia. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Treaty Organization (SCO) are examples of the former. The latter consists of the Eurasian Economic Union between Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Russia's relations with African governments are addressed to get political gains by developing economic and also military ventures. Trade between Russia and Africa is small but rising. Furthering the anti-Western attitudes of the African governments is the wished-for outcome of the large participation of Russian troops in the UN peacekeeping intervention in African countries.

Briefly, Putin's assertive policy is close to the disruptive tactics of a spoiler state rather than to the positive plan of a revisionist actor that aims at significantly delegitimising the existing world order. Russia does not have the economic and overall power to reshape the world order and government, but is able to put under threat, even by resorting to military aggression, in the areas not far from its borders.

Summing it all, the United States, still the most powerful state, qualifies as a revisionist state that wants just to amend the existing order. The rise of China's world status has been made by a wise and cautious strategy that has exploited the opportunities of the existing institutions and policies. Accordingly, China is on alert, preparing a kind of protective revisionist response because the de-legitimation of the current world policies can produce unsustainable conditions in the world economy and as well political instability damaging the China's status ascendancy. Assertive Russia wants to be of the party of

the likely hegemonic states. But, limited economic capabilities give to Russia limited coalition power and few resources to build a viable revisionist strategy.

### **Moving towards the macro-decision phase**

In contrast to the hegemony school studies of the past that gave evidence of the world wars waged to gain world leadership, presently the researchers address studies to uncover macro-transformations that are diverting the cycle of world politics from the track it travelled through in the past. They assume that transformation of the social, technological, economic, and ideological environment of the world political system could make violent confrontation highly improbable as the mechanism of order transition.

Reviewing the past 500 years development of world order, Rasler and Thompson (2005) remark the long-term transformation of warfare, systemic leadership, and trade that makes the world system more pacific than the previous ones. On a different path, Linklater (2010) has studied the civilization process of international politics of the past centuries, and demonstrated the establishment of mechanisms and procedures that diminish the recourse to violence for solving the conflict of interest among states. Such assertion matches the thesis of the obsolescence of major wars. The costs of extreme conflict will moderate global power competition and make resort to violence between world powers not an option (Mueller, 1989). Last, a tremendous political process enabled new institutional and intergovernmental methods and mechanisms of dialogue on contentious policy issues.

Some Chinese scholars propose to shape the next world order by combining the values of the major country coalitions and drawing the co-leadership of the major world powers (Yan, 2018; Yang, 2018). Others give evidence of the *third possibility*: the emergence of an alternative international order that is not provoked by a single rising power and a waning hegemon, but by states which do not intentionally join in a formal or informal coalition but intentionally gravitate toward a new set of patterns and rules of behaviour in international politics (Barma, Chiozza, Ratner, and Weber, 2009). Such states are the major non-Western states and economies that *trade and coordinate at the United Nations with each other above and beyond what is expected given their level of development, geographic position, market size, domestic political institutions, and geopolitical and colonial ties* (2019: 581-586). Last, Danner and Martin (2018) demonstrates that exit from the American hegemony might take the form of the *Dutch global hegemonic model*. It entered into action by the gradual exclusion of Portugal from trade in the Indies. Danner and Martin suggest that the current China's ascendance to the world hegemony, which is focused on trade and financial concerns as it was the Dutch one, will continue to grow without violent conflict and with no imposition of political and ideological norms and values.

### **Concluding remarks**

In the past centuries, great powers and coalitions went to war to reshape world order and gain the world leadership. Two theories — the power transition and the hegemony theory — focus on great power war as the key mecha-

nism of order transition. Both theories conceive the world order as the venture of one state, but only the hegemony theory praises leadership capabilities and point out the coalition-making power of the state endowed with hegemonic qualities. Since no order lasts forever, both theories explain transition by the dissatisfaction and will of the rising power to revise the principles and institutions of world politics. Both theories assume that the rising power is prone to embracing the costs of all-out war in order to turn down the existing system order and get the benefits of the new one. However, scientists admit that such assumption is questionable in today's world and argue about conditions that make uncertain the circumstances favouring the violent confrontation between the leading and the challenging country.

The Post-World War order was established to face two key problems, the establishment of the sovereign nation-state in every site of the world, and the stability and growth of national economies and the world market. In IR literature, the values and principles of the policies towards these problems are known as the values and principles of *liberal internationalism*. The governments of the Western countries put such values and principles as the founding stones of the post-war order and government. They made such decision because these values and principles fitted to the political and economic interests of the states of the Western coalition. In the following times, the Western countries defended the realization of these values and principles by implementing world policies that promote also their own interest. In truth, the world policies did not always fit to liberalism but to the interest of the Western countries. The Western coalition did not serve liberal internationalism. On the contrary, liberal internationalism served the Western countries. However, many states have interiorized liberal internationalism values, and have been socialized to the policies of the existing order. Therefore, some authors believe in the ability of the great powers belonging to different regions and cultures to organize the world order. They remark that an alternative, not Western country-led, order is emerging in the developing world because the largest countries of all the world regions are preferentially connecting with each other and reducing their exposure to the Western values. The present article argued for missing empirical evidence about such interpretation of the current order transition, but the growing actorness of non-Western countries in world politics has not been dismissed.

Economic growth and the stability of the state, the problems that the coalition of the world war victorious states wanted to face seventy years ago, are still high on the agenda of the world political system. In addition, new problems have been growing in numbers on the world agenda. Ecological degradation and climate change, cyberspace insecurity, increased human mobility and migration, and all the problems caused by the enhanced permeability of the state borders are waiting in the world political space to enter in the policy-making pipeline of the world institutions. The present chapter has called the attention of the IR scientists on revisiting the theories of order transition on the belief that order transition is the prior condition to meet with in order to respond to the old and new problems of the world political system.

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Стаття надійшла до редакції 22.06.2020

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## ТЕОРІЇ ТРАНЗИТУ СВІТОВОГО ПОРЯДКУ І СУЧАСНА ФАЗА СВІТОВОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ

### Резюме

Дослідження зміни світового політичного порядку знову популярні. Що слідє за занепадом потужності Сполучених Штатів і зростаючою потужністю Китаю, що слідє за ослабленням зв'язків існуючих альянсів і коаліцій, що слідє за кризою світової політики щодо торгівлі і фінансів, — все це основні об'єкти досліджень вчених у галузі міжнародних відносин. Дослідники звертаються до вивчення порядку транзиту, застосовуючи онтологію холізму або індивідуалізму. Відповідно до першого підходу, для розуміння транзиту від існуючого порядку до майбутнього важливі знання про структуру і процеси світової політичної системи, а також про вплив зовнішнього економічного, технологічного, геофізичного та культурного середовища. На противагу вченим, які представляють цілісну або системну перспективу, вчений, який застосовує онтологію індивідуалізму, формує знання про

перехід порядку, аналізуючи поодинокі феномени і зіставляючи дані про завдання, ресурси і можливості досліджуваних феноменів. Ця стаття розвиває знання про транзит світового порядку і як самостійну проблему теорії міжнародних відносин, і як предмет теоретичного емпіричного дослідження, яке спрямоване на те, щоб зрозуміти рух від затухаючого американського порядку до майбутнього невідомого.

У статті розглядаються три школи досліджень політичного транзиту нового світового порядку і висвітлюються подібність та відмінності в контексті аналізу їх онтологічної перспективи. Школи представляють давно усталені теорію гегемонії і теорію переходу (транзиту) влади, а також недавні аргументи про взаємозв'язок регіональних порядків, які розвивають послідовники школи регіональних досліджень. У всіх трьох школах «Великі Держави» (Great Power) мають особливе значення в побудові та зміні глобального порядку. Але між теоріями є істотна різниця. Теорія гегемонії ставить «Велику Державу» в центр мережі системних взаємодій, яка обмежує роль «Великої Держави» і поступово покладе край гегемоністському порядку. Отже, теорія гегемонії — це дійсно цілісна теорія і вона «займає поле холізму». Теорія транзиту влади, спочатку справжня індивідуалістична теорія, що отримала розвиток в сімействі реалістських теорій, відійшла від індивідуалізму і схиляється до інтеграції індивідуалізму в системну перспективу, прагнучи враховувати вплив системних обмежень на відносини між домінуючою силою та її противником. Оскільки такі відносини є ключем до трансформації порядку, ця теорія розмищується між двома онтологічними підходами. Теорія взаємопов'язаних регіональних порядків займає індивідуалістичне поле і відводить великим державам регіонів роль порушників порядку як на регіональному, так і на світовому рівні. Прихильники цієї школи вважають вихід з нинішнього безладу першим випадком побудови багатопольярного світового порядку, створеного регіональними державами. Отже, така школа апелює до суб'єкт-орієнтованої онтології. Автор зазначає, що запропонована класифікація не претендує на те, щоб бути досконалою, але, як і всі класифікації та узагальнення, корисна для позначення подібності і відмінностей і для полегшення просування досліджень через узагальнення підходів.

У статті наводяться аргументи щодо відсутності емпіричних даних для інтерпретації нинішнього переходу до глобального порядку, оскільки проблеми, з якими коаліція держав-переможниць зіткнулася сімдесят років тому, як і раніше стоять на порядку денному світової політичної системи. У статті застосовується перспектива цілісної (холістської) онтології і обґрунтовуються переваги використання теорії гегемонії як найбільш придатної для розуміння складності руху від легітимізованого американського гегемоністського порядку до майбутнього невідомого.

У першому розділі статті представлені концепції дослідження транзиту світового порядку. У другому розділі порівнюються три теорії транзиту. У третьому розділі простежується прогрес сучасного світового порядку і політики від Другої світової війни до наших днів, що переходить до нового світового порядку. Четвертий розділ і заключні зауваження вказують на деякі помітні проблеми у вивченні транзиту до наступного порядку.

**Ключові слова:** гегемонія, влада, порядок, транзит, регіони, теорії міжнародних відносин.



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## **ТЕОРИИ ТРАНЗИТА МИРОВОГО ПОРЯДКА И СОВРЕМЕННАЯ ФАЗА МИРОВОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ**

### **Резюме**

Исследования смены мирового политического порядка вновь популярны. Что следует за упадком мощи Соединенных Штатов и неопознанной растущей мощью Китая, что следует за ослаблением связей существующих альянсов и коалиций, что следует за кризисом мировой политики в отношении торговли и финансов, — это основные объекты исследований ученых в области международных отношений. Исследователи обращаются к изучению порядка перехода, применяя онтологию холизма или индивидуализма. Согласно первому подходу, для понимания транзита от существующего порядка к будущему важны знания о структуре и процессе мировой политической системы и о влиянии внешней экономической, технологической, геофизической и культурной среды. В противоположность ученым, представляющим целостную или системную перспективу, ученый, применяющий онтологию индивидуализма, формирует знания о переходе порядка, анализируя единичные состояния и сопоставляя данные о целях, ресурсах и возможностях исследуемых состояний. Настоящая статья развивает знания о транзите мирового порядка и как самостоятельную проблему теории международных отношений, и как предмет теоретического эмпирического исследования, которое направлено на то, чтобы понять движение от затухающего американского порядка к будущему неизвестному.

В статье рассматриваются три школы исследований транзита нового мирового порядка, освещается их сходство и различие на в контексте их онтологической перспективы. Школы представляют давно установившиеся теории гегемонии и теории транзита власти, а также недавние аргументы о взаимосвязанности региональных порядков, которые развивают последователи школы региональных исследований. Во всех трех школах «Великие Государства» (Great Power) имеют особое значение в построении и изменении порядка. Но между теориями есть существенная разница. Теория гегемонии ставит «Великое Государство» в центр сети системных взаимодействий, которая ограничивает его роль и постепенно положит конец гегемонистскому порядку. Следовательно, теория гегемонии — это действительно целостная теория и она «занимает поле холизма». Теория транзита власти, первоначально подлинная индивидуалистическая теория, развивавшаяся в семействе реалистических теорий, отошла от индивидуализма и склоняется к интеграции индивидуализма в системную перспективу и стремится учитывать влияние системных ограничений на отношения между доминирующей силой и ее противником. Поскольку такие отношения являются ключом к трансформации порядка, эта теория размещается между двумя онтологическими подходами. Теория взаимосвязанных региональных порядков занимает индивидуалистическое поле и отводит великим державам регионов роль устранения порядка как на региональном, так и на мировом уровне. Сторонники этой школы считают выход из нынешнего беспорядка первым случаем построения многополярного мирового порядка, созданного региональными державами. Следовательно, такая школа ориентирована на субъект-ориентированную онтологию. Автор отмечает, что предложенная классификация не претендует на то, чтобы быть совершенной, но, как и все классификации и обобщения, полезна для обозначения сходства и различий и для облегчения продвижения исследований через обобщение подходов.

В статье приводятся аргументы в пользу отсутствия эмпирических данных об интерпретации нынешнего транзита к порядку, поскольку проблемы, с которыми коалиция победивших в мировой войне государств столкнулась семьдесят лет назад, по-прежнему стоят на повестке дня мировой политической системы. В статье применяется перспектива целостной (холистской) онтологии и обосновываются преимущества использования теории гегемонии как наиболее подходящей для понимания сложности движения от легитимизированного американского гегемонистского порядка к будущему неизвестному.

В первом разделе статьи представлены концепции исследования транзита мирового порядка. Во втором разделе сравниваются три теории политического транзита мирового порядка. В третьем разделе прослеживается прогресс современного мирового порядка и политики от Второй мировой войны до наших дней, переходящий к новому мировому порядку. Четвертый раздел и заключительные замечания указывают на некоторые заметные проблемы в изучении транзита в следующем порядке.

**Ключевые слова:** гегемония, власть, порядок, транзит, регионы, теории международных отношений.